Impact of the Court of International Trade on the Department of Commerce’s Administration of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws by Powell, Stephen J et al.
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 10
Issue 2 International Court of Trade Symposium Article 3
8-1-1987
Impact of the Court of International Trade on the
Department of Commerce’s Administration of the






Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr
Part of the International Trade Commons
This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston
College Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stephen J. Powell, Berniece A. Browne, Eileen P. Shannon, Andrea E. Migdall, and John D.
McInerney, Impact of the Court of International Trade on the Department of Commerce’s Administration
of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 10 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 181 (1987),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol10/iss2/3
Impact of the Court of International Trade on 
the Department of Commerce's 
Administration of the Antidumping 
and Countervailing Duty Laws 
by Stephen J. Powell* 
Berniece A. Browne 
Eileen P. Shannon 
Andrea E. Migdall 
John D. McInerney 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since January 1980 the International Trade Administration (ITA) of the 
Department of Commerce has been responsible for administering two of the 
country's most important unfair trade laws, the antidumping and countervailing 
duty provisions. With this responsibility, the Department received a statutorily 
mandated set of procedures, governing investigations and administrative re-
views, that did not exist during the extensive prior history of these laws. These 
procedures were intended to ensure that parties were guaranteed access to the 
facts and were given an opportunity to comment before the final determination 
was made. 
To complement these new, more open and participatory administrative pro-
cedures, Congress also changed the standard of review by the Court of Inter-
national Trade (CIT). De novo review of antidumping and countervailing duty 
determinations was eliminated. The CIT now reviews Commerce determina-
tions based on the administrative record created during the proceeding and 
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will overturn an agency determination if it is not supported by substantial 
evidence on the record or is not otherwise in accordance with law. 
Although the more open and participatory administrative procedures and 
the new judicial review standard have been in effect since 1980, only in the last 
two years has court opinion brought into focus issues involving the relationship 
between the agency and the courts, and the separate powers of each. The issues 
discussed in this paper concern the relationship of the Court of International 
Trade and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) to Department 
of Commerce ("Department," "Commerce," or "agency") proceedings. 
We begin with recent court decisions regarding when a party must exhaust 
its administrative remedies, and what standing requirements a party must meet 
in order to maintain an action. We then explore the various aspects of when a 
CIT decision is "final," including at what point an adverse decision by the CIT 
requires that the agency change its administrative actions so that they are 
consistent with the court decision and not with the agency's original determi-
nation. We turn next to the related issue of the court's recent opinions on the 
requirement that the agency perform a remand ordered by the CIT before it 
can appeal that decision. Finally, we look at what a Department decision on 
remand means and how and when it can be appealed. The last section of the 
paper gives our view of what changes by the Congress, the courts, or the agency 
are needed. 
These issues have been the subject of intense, controversial litigation in recent 
months. We are aware that some international trade practitioners hold the view 
that certain positions taken by the government on these issues may be inspired 
in part by a desire to avoid the natural consequences of having an agency 
finding overturned by the courts. This view is incorrect. 
As the author of the antidumping and countervailing duty judicial review 
provisions, the Department has the greatest respect for the statutory scheme of 
judicial review by the CIT and the CAFC of Commerce's interpretation of these 
complex laws and their application to specific factual situations. Not only does 
the Depar.tment strongly support giving parties their "day in court," it welcomes 
judicial review as the best guarantee that the administrative process will be 
objective, open, and characterized by well-reasoned decisions. 
The Department's motivation in approaching the exhaustion, standing, and 
finality issilrs is to see that all parties, including the Department, have the benefit 
of the carefully structured judicial review provisions of the statute. Among 
other things, this means ensuring that the agency has the chance to correct its 
own errors by exploration of the issues during the administrative proceeding. 
It also means that parties must have a meaningful opportunity to appeal CIT 
decisions. We hope this article will make clear the Department's position on 
these important issues. 
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II. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 
There are two limitations on a plaintiff's (or intervenor's) ability to sue or 
raise claims against the Department of Commerce in the Court of International 
Trade over Department determinations in antidumping and countervailing duty 
proceedings: that a plaintiff first exhaust its administrative remedies, and that 
a plaintiff must have been an interested party who was a party to the adminis-
trative proceeding. The doctrine of exhaustion is imposed on the court by a 
statute which also allows discretion in its application.' The standing requirement 
is also imposed by law, but it is not defined. 
These requirements greatly affect both the Department of Commerce2 and 
private parties, and are becoming increasingly important in light of the great 
number of appeals to the CIT in this area. The doctrine of exhaustion is of 
great importance to any administrative agency whose actions are reviewed by a 
court, and to the participants of the administrative proceedings. A clear inter-
pretation of the doctrine results in greater understanding of what issues may 
properly be appealed, on the part of the agency and private parties, and 
prevents the wasteful expenditure of substantial resources on unnecessary and 
fruitless litigation. In addition, a clear understanding of the doctrine informs 
the parties to the administrative proceeding of what issues and remedies they 
must pursue at the administrative level. This prevents the unfortunate situation 
in which the parties find that their voices may not be heard at all if they have 
failed to raise an issue at the administrative level. 
Interpretations of the particular standing requirement in judicial appeals of 
antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings are of equal importance to 
interpretations of the doctrine of exhaustion, and have a similar effect. Parties 
'28 U.S.C. § 2637 (1980) provides: 
§ 2637. Exhaustion of administrative remedies 
(a) A civil action contesting the denial of a protest under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 
1930 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade only if all liquidated duties, 
charges, or exactions have been paid at the time the action is commenced, except that a 
surety's obligation to pay such liquidated duties, charges, or exactions is limited to the sum 
of any bond related to each entry included in the denied protest. 
(b) A civil action contesting the denial of a petition under section 516 of the Tariff Act of 
1930 may be commenced in the Court of International Trade only by a person who has first 
exhausted the procedures set forth in such section. 
(c) A civil action described in section 1581(h) of this title [to review a ruling issued by the 
Secretary of the Treasury] may be commenced in the Court of International Trade prior to 
the exhaustion of administrative remedies if the person commencing the action makes the 
demonstration required by such section. 
(d) In any civil action not specified in this section [such as an action under section 516A of 
the Tariff Act of 1930, contesting an antidumping or countervailing duty determination] the 
Court of International Trade shall, where appropriate, require the exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies. 
2 The antidumping and countervailing duty laws are administered by the Import Administration of 
the International Trade Administration, United States Department of Commerce. 
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also have a substantial interest in knowing who will be allowed to appeal such 
determinations, as well as being spared the obligation of maintaining their 
position with respect to claims brought by those who are not entitled to do so. 
The Court of International Trade has recently had several opportunities to 
interpret these requirements. At first glance, it is very difficult to see a thread 
of common ideas in either the cases interpreting the doctrine of exhaustion or 
those interpreting the standing requirement. However, a closer look reveals 
similarities, and pinpoints the differences in approach by various judges of the 
court. 
A. Overview of the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
The CIT is directed by statute to require the exhaustion of administrative 
remedies "where appropriate." The doctrine of exhaustion, however, is a cre-
ation of the judiciary which over the years has developed the rule and estab-
lished certain exceptions in response to particular concerns involved in review-
ing functions committed to an administrative body by statute. It is therefore 
important to take a step back and examine the purposes of the doctrine and its 
general application by the courts, viewing the CIT's exercise of discretion against 
a background of longstanding precedents. 
Courts have widely accepted the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies as a limitation on their authority to review appeals of agency deter-
minations. Nearly fifty years ago the Supreme Court acknowledged "the long 
settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for 
a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has 
been exhausted."3 The Supreme Court subsequently declared that 
[s]imple fairness to those who are engaged in the tasks of adminis-
tration, and to litigants, requires as a general rule that courts should 
not topple over administrative decisions unless the administrative 
body not only has erred but has erred against objection made at the 
time appropriate under its practice.4 
The Court summarized the main purpose behind the doctrine as follows: "The 
basic purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to allow an administrative agency to 
perform functions within its special competence-to make a factual record, to 
apply its expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial contro-
versies."5 The Supreme Court has found the "necessity for prior administrative 
'Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938). 
4 United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952). 
5 Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34,37 (1972) (citing Me Kart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194-95 
(1969»; McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479, 485 (1971); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 
§ 20.01 et seq. (Supp. 1970). Accord Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975); Bowen v. City of 
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consideration of an issue" particularly compelling when a "decision calls for the 
application of technical knowledge and experience not usually possessed by 
judges."6 
McKart v. United States7 contains the Supreme Court's most complete exposi-
tion of the reasons for requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies. In 
that case the Court focused upon several principles of administrative law and 
responsible jurisprudence which the doctrine is intended to preserve: 
A primary purpose is, of course, the avoidance of premature inter-
ruption of the administrative process. The agency, like a trial court, 
is created for the purpose of applying a statute in the first instance. 
Accordingly, it is normally desirable to let the agency develop the 
necessary factual background upon which decisions should be based. 
And since agency decisions are frequently of a discretionary nature 
or frequently require expertise, the agency should be given the first 
chance to exercise that discretion or to apply that expertise. And of 
course it is generally more efficient for the administrative process 
to go forward without interruption than it is to permit the parties 
to seek aid from the courts at various intermediate stages. The very 
same reasons lie behind judicial rules sharply limiting interlocutory 
appeals. 
Closely related to the above reasons is a notion peculiar to ad-
ministrative law. The administrative agency is created as a separate 
entity and invested with certain powers and duties. The courts 
ordinarily should not interfere with an agency until it has completed 
its actions, or else has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction. As Professor 
Jaffe puts it, '[t]he exhaustion doctrine is, therefore, an expression 
of executive and administrative autonomy.' This reason is particu-
larly pertinent where the function of the agency and the particular 
decision sought to be reviewed involve exercise of discretionary 
powers granted the agency by Congress, or require application of 
special expertise. 
. . . In addition, other justifications for requiring exhaustion in 
cases of this sort have nothing to do with the dangers of interruption 
of the administrative process. Certain very practical notions of ju-
dicial efficiency come into playas well. A complaining party may be 
successful in vindicating his rights in the administrative process. If 
he is required to pursue his administrative remedies, the courts may 
New York, 106 S. Ct. 2022, 2032 (1986). See also Unemployment Compensation Comm'n of Alaska v. 
Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 155 (1946) ("A reviewing court usurps the agency's function when it sets aside 
the administrative determination upon a ground not theretofore presented and deprives the [agency] 
of an opportunity to consider the matter, make its ruling, and state the reasons for its action"). 
6 Federal Power Comm'n v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 348 U.S. 492, 501 (1955). 
7395 U.S. 185 (1969). 
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never have to intervene. And notions of administrative autonomy 
require that the agency be given a chance to discover and correct 
its own errors. Finally, it is possible that frequent and deliberate 
flouting of administrative processes could weaken the effectiveness 
of an agency by encouraging people to ignore its procedures.8 
Thus, the main concerns that the doctrine of exhaustion addresses may be 
summarized as respect for the autonomy of the administrative body, and greater 
efficiency in both administrative and judicial matters. The administrative body 
is granted the authority by statute to administer the law in the first instance, 
often with some discretion. This is on the assumption that it is usually more 
capable of collecting the facts, and has special expertise. This respect helps 
ensure that the agency's activities are not interrupted by premature or frivolous 
lawsuits, and that the courts are not requested to provide the same relief the 
agency itself might have provided, had it been given the opportunity. 
The exhaustion rule is not, however, applied woodenly. "[U]nless exhaustion 
of administrative remedies is mandated by statute, application of the exhaustion 
doctrine is within the discretion of the court."9 The courts have widely acknowl-
edged that certain considerations may outweigh the policies behind the doctrine, 
carving out exceptions to the rule in those cases. This is consistent with the 
Court's recognition that the doctrine of exhaustion "must be applied in each 
case with an understanding of its purposes and of the particular administrative 
scheme involved."I0 It is also generally recognized that exhaustion should not 
be required "where the obvious result would be a plain miscarriage of justice."ll 
But for the most part, the courts have attempted to maintain a balance, pre-
serving the validity of the doctrine while weighing the considerations present 
in particular cases. The generally recognized exceptions have been well reasoned 
and narrowly drawn. 12 
Exceptions have been made, for example, (1) where a significant question of 
law was not considered or ruled upon by the administrative agency, and because 
of an intervening court decision, strict adherence to the rule might have resulted 
in injustice to the plaintiff;13 (2) "when an attempt to gain the desired relief 
8 [d. at 193-95 (quoting L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 425 (1965». 
9 Timken Co. v. Vnited States, 630 F. Supp. 1327, 1334 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986) (citing SEC v. G.C. 
George Securities, Inc., 637 F.2d 685. 688 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981». 
IO Parisi, 405 V.S. at 37 (quoting McKart, 395 V.S. at 193). Accord Weinberger, 422 V.S. at 765. 
II Hormel v. Helvering, 312 V.S. 552. 558 (1941). 
12 The author of one treatise has taken a very different view. Mr. Davis has commented that "[t)he 
answer to the question whether administrative remedies must be exhausted before a court may review 
administrative action has always been yes and no, with no clear guides to when it is yes and when it is 
no." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 279 (Supp. 1982). Mr. Davis attributes this perceived 
lack of consistency to "the judicial inclination to decide exhaustion questions on the basis of the equities 
of the whole case, including the merits as well as the aspects related to exhaustion." [d. at 280. 
IS Hormel, 312 V.S. at 552. 
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from the agency in question would obviously be a futile act";14 (3) in cases where 
the agency is alleged to have patently exceeded its statutory authority; 15 (4) 
where the agency was pursuing "a system-wide, un revealed policy that was 
inconsistent in critically important ways with established regulations" and the 
policy did not "depend on the particular facts of the case before it";16 (5) in 
suits brought by plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of state welfare 
practices, under the Civil Rights Act. 17 
B. The CIT's Interpretation of the Doctrine of Exhaustion 
The Customs Courts Act of 1980,18 which created the CIT, vested the court 
with exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions appealing the Department's decisions 
in antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings. 19 It also added to U.S. 
law an entire section which directs the court to require the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies in the cases before it. 20 Under subsection (d), the court 
is directed to require the exhaustion of administrative remedies "where appro-
priate" in appeals of antidumping and countervailing duty determinations. 
Hence, the statute clearly grants the court the authority to exercise discretion 
in the application of the doctrine of exhaustion. 
On the other hand, the court is strictly limited to judicial review on the 
administrative record by § 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930.21 With the addition 
of that section in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,22 Congress eliminated de 
novo review of antidumping and countervailing duty determinations. It provided 
that the standard of review shall be whether the administrative determination 
is supported by substantial evidence on the record or is otherwise in accordance 
with law. Furthermore, the legislative history demonstrates that Congress in-
tended § 516A to serve some of the same goals as the doctrine of exhaustion, 
that is, greater efficiency and increased emphasis on the decisionmaking ability 
14 United Black Fund, Inc. v. Hampton, 352 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.D.C. 1972). 
15 Skinner and Eddy Corp. v. United States. 249 U.S. 557. 562 (1919); Leedom v. Kyne. 358 U.S. 
184. 188 (1958); Hines v. United States. 263 U.S. 143. 147 (1923). 
16 Bowen. 106 S. Ct. at 2032. 
17 King v. Smith. 392 U.S. 309. 312 n.4 (1968). It is also notable that the Supreme Court refused to 
allow an exception in a class action brought on behalf of persons who had not exhausted their 
administrative remedies. essentially precluding that avenue of relief. Weinberger v. SaUl. 422 U.S. 749 
(1975). 
18 Customs Court Act of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-417. 94 Stat. 1727 (1980) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of Title 28 of the United States Code). 
19 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1984). 
20 See supra note I and accompanying text. 
21 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1982). 
22 Pub. L. No. 96-39. 93 Stat. 144 (codified as amended at scattered sections of titles 19 and 26 of 
the United States Code). 
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of the administrative body.23 Congress explicitly stated that traditional admin-
istrative law principles, of which the doctrine of exhaustion is clearly one, were 
embodied in the provision.24 
The CIT's recent decisions indicate that although the court believes that 
exhaustion of administrative remedies is required as a general rule, it freely 
allows exceptions in circumstances which are similar to those in which exceptions 
have been granted by other courts. However, the court has not always fully 
analyzed the impact of, or justification for, allowing an exception in that partic-
ular case. The analysis of the requirement of exhaustion in light of the particular 
circumstances of a case, as we have already seen, is at the very heart of the 
doctrine. The extent to which it has allowed exceptions in some instances implies 
that the burden is usually upon the government to show that it would be 
"appropriate" to require exhaustion in a given case. On the other hand, the 
CIT expends significant effort in discussing the importance of the doctrine. 
The court's decision in Kokusai Electric Co. Ltd. v. United States,25 demonstrates 
that it will enforce the requirement in at least some circumstances. 
In Kokusai the court held that plaintiff had failed to exhaust its administrative 
remedies. The court, however, declined to decide whether the Department had 
improperly included subassemblies in the scope of its antidumping duty inves-
tigation of cell site transceivers from Japan because the plaintiff had not raised 
the issue before the Department until after its final determination. The court's 
ruling that exhaustion was required was based upon what the court considered 
clear evidence in the administrative record that the plaintiff was aware of the 
Department's actions but completely failed to raise the issue in a timely fashion. 
The court's opinion contains a discussion of the doctrine of exhaustion which 
recognizes that "[gjenerally, a reviewing court would usurp the function of the 
agency if it were to set aside an administrative determination upon a ground 
not previously presented, thereby depriving the agency of a chance to consider 
the matter."26 It then qualified that statement by referring to an administrative 
., Section 516A would remove all doubt on whether de novo review is appropriate by excluding de 
novo review from consideration as a standard in antidumping and countervailing duty determinations. 
De novo review is both time-consuming and duplicative. The amendments made by Title I of the Trade 
Agreements Act provide all parties with greater rights of participation at the administrative level and 
increased access to information upon which the decisions of the administering authority and the 
International Trade Commission are based. These changes, along with the new requirement for a 
record of the proceeding, have eliminated any need for de novo review. S. Rep. No. 96-249, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 251-52 (1979); reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 381, 637. 
24 "Section 516A would make it clear that traditional administrative law principles are to be applied 
in reviewing antidumping and countervailing duty decisions where by law Congress has entrusted the 
decision making authority in a specialized, complex economic situation to administrative agencies .... " 
S. Rep. No. 96-249 at 252; 1979 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 638. 
25 632 F. Supp. 23 (Ct. Int'I Trade 1986). 
26 632 F. Supp. at 28 (citing Unemployment Compensation Comm'n of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 
143, 145 (1946). 
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law treatise which notes that courts have the power to exercise discretion by 
taking into account the particular circumstances and "the Court's idea as to 
what justice requires. "27 
In spite of its reliance upon the latter authority, which appears to support 
sweeping powers of discretion in applying the doctrine, the court in Kokusai 
stated firmly that only exceptional circumstances would justify departure from 
the requirement: 
[I]n the absence of extraordinary circumstances excusing the neglect to 
raise before Commerce the issue whether or not the related subas-
semblies were within the scope of the investigation, the ... Court 
will not permit the plaintiff to raise the issue after Commerce closed 
its investigation.28 
The court then found the particular circumstances less than "exceptional." It 
stated that, by failing to raise the issue before Commerce during the investi-
gation, the "plaintiff slept on its rights."29 The court placed great weight on the 
fact that the plaintiff was apparently aware of the Department's inclusion of the 
contested product throughout the investigation: 
The ... Court finds not only did plaintiff fail to offer an excuse for 
not raising the issue before Commerce, but further plaintiff partic-
ipated in the Commerce investigation proceedings as though related 
subassemblies were within the scope of the investigation. Plaintiff 
cannot be heard to complain at this juncture in the proceedings that 
the issue, which it wished to have considered but never brought up 
before Commerce, did not receive full consideration.30 
In contrast to its strict interpretation of the exhaustion rule in Kokusai, how-
ever, the court allowed plaintiffs to escape the requirement with relative ease 
in three other decisions. 
In Washington Red Raspberry Commission v. United States31 the CIT refused to 
give any consideration to the Department's claim that plaintiff had not properly 
exhausted its administrative remedies. Washington Red Raspberry Commission was 
a CIT decision on an appeal of the final antidumping determination with respect 
to red raspberries from Canada. The plaintiff, petitioner in the investigation 
below, raised numerous issues on appeal. One of its arguments concerned 
whether a relationship existed between Canadian raspberry growers and the 
cooperatives to which they belonged and which processed and sold their mer-
27 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 26.7 at 444 (2d ed. 1983). 
28 632 F. Supp. at 28 (emphasis added). 
29 [d. at 27 . 
• 0 [d. at 28. 
31 No. 87-29, slip op. at 7 (Ct. Int'l Trade, March 17, 1987). 
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chandise. The plaintiff contended that there was no relationship and that there-
fore Commerce should not have disregarded the prices of transactions between 
these parties. 
The court refused to consider seriously Commerce's argument that plaintiff 
had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies regarding this issue. It found 
that the plaintiff had no reason to raise this issue below. The court explained 
its decision in a brief footnote that evidences something close to contempt for 
the doctrine of exhaustion: 
During oral argument on plaintiffs' motion, counsel for the defen-
dants admitted that the co-operatives do not "fit neatly" into any of 
the statutory definitions of related parties. Rather, counsel sought 
refuge on the procedural point that the petitioners had not raised 
this issue below. The plaintiffs rebutted this argument, persuasively, 
through their claim that there had been no reason to raise it below 
in view of past ITA precedent and the absence of factual justification 
to disregard the prices paid to the growers.32 
Although this is not spelled out in the opinion, the court apparently reasoned 
that plaintiff's claim would have been futile if raised below, because of the 
apparent rigidity of Commerce's position on the disregard of transaction prices 
between related parties. That position, however, still left room for discretion 
regarding the definition of "related." Moreover, the court essentially ignored 
the fact that the plaintiff was fully aware of and had ample opportunities to 
comment on this decision, which was made in the early stages of the investiga-
tion, before the preliminary and final determinations. 
A second decision, Philipp Brothers, Inc. v. United States,33 involved the second 
administrative review of the countervailing duty order on pig iron from Brazil 
under § 751 of the Tariff Act of 1930.34 During the investigation, the Depart-
ment had estimated duties for the largest exporters on a company specific basis. 
In the second administrative review (as in the first such review), the Department 
assessed duties on a country-wide basis. The plaintiff failed to comment on this 
issue. Nevertheless, the plaintiff brought suit in the CIT to challenge the coun-
try-wide method of assessment in the second administrative review, claiming 
that there were material differences in the amount of benefits which had not 
been accounted for. Consequently, the Department raised as a defense the 
plaintiff's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies. 
In Philipp Brothers the court placed great emphasis on the exhaustion require-
ment, citing several cases which established the requirement as a general rule. 35 
32 Id. at 7 n.6. 
33 630 F. Supp. 1317 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986). 
34 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (1984). 
35 630 F. Supp. at 1319-20. 
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It noted, however, that a "plaintiff's failure to exhaust its administrative rem-
edies is not always fatal to its case,"36 and proceeded to carve out an exception 
to the general rule. 
The plaintiff's position was that it was excused from raising the issue before 
the Commerce Department because it was entitled to "rely on the expectation 
that Commerce would act in accordance with this court's decision in Florsheim."37 
Ambassador Division of Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States38 was decided the day 
after the preliminary results were issued in the contested review. The Florsheim 
decision involved an issue entirely different from the subject of the original 
complaint in Philipp Brothers. Its holding was that countervailing duties could 
not be assessed retroactively; it had nothing whatsoever to do with the issue of 
country-wide versus company specific margins. The plaintiff's contention 
(which it had also failed to present before the Department) was that under 
Florsheim the administrative review would have no effect, so that the plaintiff 
was not required to raise the issue of the country-wide margin during the review. 
The court accepted the plaintiff's argument to a degree. It qualified its 
decision, noting that "[e]ven in such a situation, plaintiff might have the burden 
of presenting alternative arguments to ITA prior to raising those arguments to 
this court."39 It found, however, that "further aggravating factors exist."40 The 
plaintiff's access to the confidential record, which the court seemed to believe 
exclusively contained the facts upon which the argument would have been 
based, was preempted by Commerce's failure to give timely notice of the dead-
line for requesting confidential information. The deadline had been published 
in the Federal Register, but the court deemed the published notice inadequate. 
The court held that the combination of these two factors "tipped the scale" 
in favor of hearing the plaintiff's new claim despite the failure to raise it before 
the Department: 
Separately, neither of these factors necessarily tips the scale against 
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, but the result is 
clear if they are weighed together. The court considers it inappro-
priate to require plaintiff, under the doctrine of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies, to argue to ITA for adherence to clearly 
applicable precedent, to anticipate disregard of the precedent and 
to then raise alternative arguments to the agency, the basis for which 
plaintiff could not know.41 
36Id. at 1320. 
37 Id. 
38 577 F. Supp. 1016 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983), rev'd, 748 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
39 630 F. Supp. at 1321. 
40/d. 
41/d. 
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Thus, the court appears to have fashioned an exception to the exhaustion 
requirement unique to the facts of this case in an attempt to avoid what it 
perceived as a substantial injustice to the plaintiff. The decision may be criti-
cized, however, for a number of reasons. First, the court overlooked the negli-
gence of the plaintiff in failing to raise, during the administrative review, a 
fundamental issue-the method of calculating the countervailing duty margin. 
Second, the court deemed the publication of a deadline in the Federal Register 
inadequate in spite of the statutory provision prescribing such notice. Third, 
the court characterized as "clearly applicable precedent" a CIT decision the 
relevance of which had not been argued by plaintiff, and which the CIT itself 
might have subsequently chosen not to follow, if it had not been reversed by 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
A week after the Philipp Brothers decision, the Court issued its opinion in 
Timken Co. v. United States. 42 This decision is a model of thorough analysis of 
the application of the exhaustion doctrine by the CIT. The court not only 
demonstrated its usual respect for the doctrine in Timken, but also examined 
the propriety of requiring exhaustion by evaluating the purposes of the doctrine 
in light of the actual facts of the case and the relative harm to each of the 
parties, and based its decision upon that analysis. 
In Timken the CIT interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d) as not posing a bar to the 
exercise of jurisdiction because it allows the court discretion: "The relevant 
statute provides only that the Court of International Trade shall 'where appro-
priate' require exhaustion of administrative remedies, and so does not create a 
jurisdictional bar to review of issues not raised below."43 The court also ruled 
that where there has been a judicial interpretation of existing law after the 
administrative decision which "could have a substantial impact"44 upon the agen-
cy's determination, plaintiff's claim will not be barred because of failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies. 
The court held that exhaustion was not required with respect to both issues 
that plaintiff was attempting to raise for the first time before the court. The 
plaintiff's first claim related to the Department's reliance upon outdated data 
in its determination of whether to revoke an antidumping duty order. In Freeport 
Minerals Co. v. United States,45 decided after the Department's determination in 
Timken, the Court of Appeals ruled that such reliance constituted an abuse of 
discretion.46 The Timken court distinguished Freeport Minerals, emphasizing that 
the issue in Timken was legal rather than factual, so that the court could not be 
42 630 F. Supp. 1327 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986). 
43 !d. at 1334 n.2. 
44 !d. at 1334. 
45 776 F.2d 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
46 But see UST, Inc. v. United States, 831 F.2d 1028 (1987). 
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accused of usurping the agency's fact finding function. Additionally, the court 
took into account the fact that the plaintiff had not intentionally refrained from 
raising the issue in order to obtain some "special advantage." Since the decision 
in Freeport Minerals was issued after the Department's determination that was 
contested in Timken, it presumably took the plaintiff by surprise. 
The second claim in Timken involved the Department's alleged failure to 
obtain complete data of another type, both during the contested review and the 
first remand proceeding.47 The Department admitted that plaintiff was correct, 
and requested a remand to collect the additional information. But the defen-
dant-intervenor contested the claim on the ground that the plaintiff had failed 
to raise the issue during the administrative review. The court decided that the 
circumstances warranted an exception to the exhaustion doctrine and agreed 
to decide the issue, supporting its decision with a litany of reasons. 
The court began its analysis by pointing out that it possesses discretion in 
applying the doctrine of exhaustion.48 The court found that, because the De-
partment itself was requesting a remand to correct these "grave" errors, the 
desire for finality was outweighed by the public interest in reaching the right 
result. The position of the Department also obviated the concern that the court 
might be usurping the agency's function by failing to require exhaustion. The 
court also noted that the Department had violated a significant public policy by 
failing to provide the same quality of review in this review of a Department of 
Treasury determination as it provides in other reviews of proceedings handled 
from their inception. The court did acknowledge that defendant-intervenor 
would incur substantial costs and inconvenience in the event of a second remand 
and that plaintiff "could and should have raised its concerns ... during the 
original proceeding before the ITA."49 It noted that two considerations under-
lying the exhaustion doctrine were fairness to the litigants, and the discourage-
ment of delay in raising claims. But the court found "on balance that the 
interests of justice require a remand."50 
Two earlier decisions of the Court of International Trade also contain inter-
pretations of the doctrine of exhaustion. Th~ court's decision in Miller and Co. 
v. United States51 actually has more bearing on the court's interpretation of the 
standing requirement, but it also includes a ruling with respect to the exhaustion 
47 Timken Co. v. United States, 7 Ct. Int'l Trade 319 (1984). 
48 The court cited CAB v. Delta Air Lines Inc., 367 U.S. 316, 321 (1961), for the proposition that 
"[w)henever a question concerning administrative, or judicial, reconsideration arises, two opposing 
policies immediately demand recognition: the desirability of finality, on the one hand, and the public 
interest in reaching what, ultimately, appears to be the right result on the other." 630 F. Supp. at 1340 
(footnote omitted). 
49 630 F. Supp. at 1341. 
50Id. 
51 598 F. Supp. 1126 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984). 
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doctrine. In Miller the CIT recognized that an exception to the general rule 
was created "when a plaintiff alleges that an agency has exceeded its statutory 
powers."52 While this is an accepted exception to the exhaustion rule, the court 
applied the exception to an allegation which did not even raise the possibility 
of an action so egregious as to exceed statutory authority. 
Miller involved an importer which had not participated in the administrative 
review of the countervailing duty order on pig iron from Brazil. The importer 
challenged the review anyway, alleging that Commerce had exceeded its au-
thority by conducting a review after the statutory deadline, and assessing duties 
retroactively. The plaintiff cited Florsheim Shoe as support for its argument.53 
When the plaintiff moved to amend its complaint to assert additional grounds 
for jurisdiction, the Department opposed the motion and requested summary 
judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff had no standing. 
The court denied the motion to amend, but issued an opinion reserving its 
decision on the standing of the plaintiff until the merits of the case had been 
briefed. The court's holding was based on the fact that because the plaintiff was 
alleging an ultra vires act of the Department, it might be exempted from the 
requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies, and therefore might 
have standing on that basis. The court stated that a mere challenge to the 
agency's authority to make a decision was insufficient to excuse the failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies. A "patent violation of agency authority,"5. an 
agency action which is ultra vires, had to be alleged. 
In another action before the CIT, Rhone Poulenc, S.A. v. United States,55 the 
plaintiffs attempted to raise a new claim which had not been ruled upon at the 
administrative level, by invoking a CIT decision which had been issued after 
the Department's contested determination. The court allowed the claim to be 
heard. The timing of that claim demonstrates an extreme example of the 
latitude the court affords parties who raise new arguments based upon inter-
vening decisions of the court. 
In Rhone Poulenc the plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to include a 
new allegation challenging the Department's application of the exporter's sale 
price (ESP) offset cap pursuant to regulation. The CIT had struck down that 
portion of the regulation in Silver Reed America, Inc. v. United States,56 which was 
decided shortly before oral argument in Rhone Poulenc. The plaintiffs first raised 
the issue at oral argument. The Department objected, arguing that the issue 
had not been raised during the contested proceeding. The court, however, 
"!d. at 1130 (citing Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U.S. 557, 562 (1919)). 
53 577 F. Supp. 1016 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983). 
54 598 F. Supp. at 1130 (citing Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 189 (1958)). 
55 583 F. Supp. 607 (Ct. In!,1 Trade 1984). 
56 581 F. Supp. 1290 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), rev'd, Consumer Products Division, SCM Corp. v. Silver 
Reed America, Inc., 753 F.2d 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
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ruled that the exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required. It relied 
upon Hormel v. Helvering,S7 in which "the Supreme Court had just issued an 
opinion which made the previously unraised issue determinative, therefore the 
court considered the new point of law even absent administrative exhaustion."s8 
The court concluded that it would have been futile for the plaintiffs to propose 
that the Department disobey its own regulation, as the regulation was apparently 
mandatory. It is generally recognized that plaintiffs should not be required to 
perform futile acts at the administrative level. Finally, the court found that the 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies did not result in prejudice to the 
Department. 
The court also discussed its interpretation of the exhaustion rule: "[T]his 
court need only require exhaustion of administrative remedies 'where appro-
priate."'s9 Although it admitted that exhaustion is "normally ... required before 
a litigant will be allowed to raise a claim via a civil action,"60 the former statement 
implies a reluctance to apply the doctrine at all. 
In addition, the court's decision is based upon the erroneous assumption that 
the Department would automatically dismiss any argument questioning the 
validity of one of its regulations, so that any request for relief of that kind 
would necessarily be futile. While it may not have been within the Department's 
power to ignore the regulation completely in that case, the Department is vested 
with a certain amount of discretion in applying its regulations and certainly has 
the power to amend them. If the Department had been given the opportunity 
to hear the claim in the first instance, the plaintiffs' concerns might have been 
addressed sufficiently through the administrative process. 
C. The Requirement of Standing 
An integral part of the requirement that a plaintiff (or intervenor) must have 
first exhausted its administrative remedies in antidumping and countervailing 
duty proceedings before taking its case to the CIT is that a plaintiff or intervenor 
must have been an "interested party who was a party to the proceeding." This 
requirement was imposed by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,61 and has 
been codified in two sections of the statute.62 
57 312 U.S. 552 (1941). 
58 583 F. Supp. at 610. 
59 !d. at 611. 
60 [d. at 609. 
61 Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified as amended at scattered sections of titles 19 and 26 of 
the United States Code). 
62 19 U.S.c. § 1516a(d) (1984) provides: 
(d) Standing 
Any interested party who was a party to the proceeding under section 1303 of this title or 
subtitle IV of this chapter shall have the right to appear and be heard as a party in interest 
before the United States Court of International Trade. The party filing the action shall notify 
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The Court of International Trade has accepted without reservation that a 
plaintiff or intervenor must comply with these statutory prerequisites of stand-
ing.63 There have been conflicting views, however, as to the meaning of the 
term "interested party who was a party to the proceeding," as it is not defined 
in either the statute or legislative history. 
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 did define the term "interested party" 
for purposes of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws. The Trade and 
Tariff Act of 198464 slightly amended that definition. "Interested party" is 
currently defined as 
(A) a foreign manufacturer, producer, or exporter, or the United 
States importer, of merchandise which is the subject of an investi-
gation under this title or a trade or business association a majority 
of the members of which which are importers of such merchandise, 
(B) the government of a country in which such merchandise is 
produced or manufactured, 
(C) a manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler in the United States 
of a like product, 
(D) a certified union or recognized union or group of workers 
which is representative of an industry engaged in the manufacture, 
production, or wholesale in the United States of a like product, 
(£) a trade or business association a majority of whose members 
manufacture, produce, or wholesale a like product in the United 
States, and 
(F) an association, a majority of whose members is composed of 
interested parties described in subparagraph (C), (D), or (£) with 
respect to a like product.65 
The statute does not, however, define "party to the proceeding." In an attempt 
to remedy that omission, the Department included a definition of "party to the 
proceeding" in the 1980 regulations which implemented the Trade Agreements 
Act of 1979: 
all such interested parties of the filing of an action under such section, in the form, manner, 
style, and within the time prescribed by rules of the court. 
28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(I)(B) (1984) provides: 
(j)(I) Any person who would be adversely affected or aggrieved by a decision in a civil action 
pending in the Court of International Trade may, by leave of court, intervene in such action, 
except that 
(B) in a civil action under section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930, only an interested party 
who was a party to the proceeding in connection with which the matter arose may intervene, 
and such person may intervene as a matter of right. 
6.'1 See, e.g., Rhone Potenc, S.A. v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 607, 611 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984). 
64 Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 3024 (codified at scattered sections of Title 19 of the United States 
Code). 
65 19 U.S.C. § l677(a) (1984). 
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(i) Party to the proceeding. "Party to the proceeding" means: 
(1) The petitioner; 
(2) The government of the country in which the merchandise 
subject to the investigation is manufactured or produced, or from 
which it is exported; 
(3) Foreign manufacturers, producers and exporters of the mer-
chandise subject to the investigation; and 
(4) Any other interested party, within the meaning of paragraph 
(c) [which is exactly the same as the 1979 Act], who informs the 
Secretary in writing of his intent to become a party to the proceeding 
within 20 days after the preliminary determination or who dem-
onstrates to the satisfaction of the Secretary good cause for inter-
vention.66 
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Under the Department's regulations, parties to the proceeding are furnished 
with certain exclusive rights. Interested parties, on the other hand, are not 
entitled to these rights. These rights include, the right to be notified of the 
Department's actions in an antidumping or countervailing duty proceeding, the 
right to receive confidential information subject to an administrative order, the 
right to request a hearing, and the right to request a disclosure of the infor-
mation that formed the basis of a preliminary determination or administrative 
review. The statute, however, uses the terms indiscriminately. 
It is practically impossible to provide a complete overview of the court's recent 
decisions regarding the standing requirement, as those decisions are often made 
in the context of the grant or denial of a motion to intervene and are unaccom-
panied by a formal opinion. Nevertheless, three opinions issued within the last 
two years demonstrate that although the court does not permit exceptions to 
the requirement that a party to a lawsuit must have been an "interested party 
who was a party to the proceeding," its view as to the meaning of that term is 
not quite clear. It is quite apparent, however, that the court does not strictly 
follow the definitions in the Commerce Department regulations. 
In Special Commodity Group on Non-Rubber Footwear from Brazil v. United States,67 
the court addressed the issue of whether a trade association may be permitted 
to intervene "when it qualified as an 'interested party' during the administrative 
66 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.12(i), 355.7(i) (1985). The Department's recently proposed regulations define 
"party to the proceeding" as: 
any interested party, within the meaning of paragraph [(i) or (k)] of this section, which has 
actively participated, through written submissions of factual information or written argument, 
in a particular decision by the Secretary subject to judicial review. Participation in a prior 
reviewable decision will not confer on any interested party "party to the proceeding" status 
in a subsequent decision by the Secretary subject to judicial review. 
50 Fed. Reg. 24,127 (1985) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 355.2(j» (proposed June 10, 1985); 51 Fed. 
Reg. 29,056 (1986) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353.2(j)) (proposed August 13, 1986). 
67 620 F. Supp. 719 (Ct. 1nt'l Trade 1985). 
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proceedings notwithstanding that by the time the action was commenced its 
composition had changed so that a majority of its members were [no longer] 
manufacturers, producers or wholesalers of a like product."68 The court granted 
the association's motion to intervene under the following analysis. 
First, the court noted that to intervene as a matter of right, the trade associ-
ation must satisfy the statutory definition of interested party, and it must have 
been a party to the proceeding. It stated that the "statute does not allow 
permissive intervention."69 The parties did not dispute that the association had 
been a party to the proceeding. The sole issue was whether it qualified as an 
interested party. The court then held that the remedial purpose of the statute, 
as described in American Grape Growers v. United States,7° justified allowing the 
association to intervene. In American Grape Growers the Court had ruled that an 
association had standing because half of its membership qualified as interested 
parties. The court reasoned that Congress had intended the "majority" require-
ment of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 to exclude broad-spectrum, general 
organizations who would always have some interested parties, and not as a strict 
numerical minimum. Because the association in Special Commodity Group still had 
a 47 percent membership of interested parties, it was deemed to have a strong 
interest in the action, and thus its "composition at the administrative proceeding 
is sufficient to place it within the intention of the statute."7l 
This decision seems reasonable. The court interpreted the standing require-
ment in light of the purpose of the law, and a more narrow and literal reading 
would have resulted in injustice to a group that clearly had a significant interest 
in both the administrative proceeding and the appeal thereof. 
In Miller and Co. v. United States72 the plaintiff, an importer, had not partici-
pated in any way in the administrative review that it wished to contest. It brought 
suit under 28 U .S.C. § IS81 (i), and moved to amend its complaint to allege 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § IS81(c). The Department moved for dismissal of 
the suit, or summary judgment, on the grounds that (l) plaintiff lacked standing 
because it had not been a party to the administrative proceeding, as required 
by 19 U.S.C. § IS16a and 28 U.S.c. § IS81(c), and (2) the court lacked juris-
diction, because plaintiff could not use section IS81 (i), the "residual jurisdiction" 
clause, to circumvent the jurisdictional prerequisites of section IS81(c). 
The court denied the plaintiff's motion to amend its complaint, ruling that 
the plaintiff had not been a party to the proceeding as required by sections 
IS16a and IS81(c): 
681d. at 720. 
69 !d. at 721. 
70 604 F. Supp. 1245 (Ct. Int't Trade 1985). 
71 Id. at 722. 
72 598 F. Supp. 1126 (Ct. Int't Trade 1984). 
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A suit may be brought under § 1581(c), however, only by "an 
interested party who is a party to the proceeding in connection with 
which the matter arises." 19 U.S:C. § 1516a(a)(2)(A). Plaintiff may 
be "an interested party," but plaintiff was not a party to the admin-
istrative proceeding out of which this action arises. Unlike the plain-
tiff in First Miss, Inc. v. United States, CIT, Slip Op. 84-14 (March 6, 
1984) (cited by plaintiff), plaintiff here does not point to a particular 
employee or agent who represented it in the agency proceedings, 
nor can it point to any reason why the ITA should have realized 
that it was participating in those particular proceedings. Absent 
these factors, it is irrelevant whether or not plaintiff's failure to 
participate prejudiced defendant or whether plaintiff's participation 
would have been futile. It is not enough that some of the participants 
have the same general interest as plaintiff. Under the statutory 
scheme plaintiff itself must participate. Thus, it appears that if this 
action must be brought under § 1581(c), it may not be maintained 
by plaintiff, because plaintiff did not participate in the relevant 
administrative proceedings. Cf Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. 
United States, 2 CIT 254, 257-58, 529 F. Supp. 664, 668-69 (1981).73 
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With respect to the second issue, the court noted that a plaintiff may not use 
§ 1581(i) to circumvent the specific jurisdictional requirements of § 1581(c): 
"[I]f § 1581(c) provides an adequate avenue of relief, plaintiff may not proceed 
under § 1581(i)."74 The court, however, found that it was not yet clear whether 
the plaintiff was required to become a party to the proceeding below due to 
the nature of its claim. The plaintiff alleged that the Department had committed 
an ultra vires act. Since there is an exception from the requirement of exhaustion 
in cases in which the administrative body is alleged to have exceeded its statutory 
authority, the court reasoned that the plaintiff might not have been required 
to participate in the administrative proceeding if the act complained of was 
patently beyond the Department's authority. The court ruled that jurisdiction 
under § 1581(i) was dependent upon the answer to this last question and re-
served judgment until the question had been fully briefed on its merits. 
What the court seems to have done in Miller is to confuse the discretion it 
has in applying the requirement of exhaustion, which is not a jurisdictional 
limitation, with the standing requirement, which goes to the very heart of 
jurisdiction and with which the court has no discretion. At the very least, this 
has now created an opportunity for a plaintiff to do just what the court said it 
would not allow-to circumvent the standing requirements of the law by filing 
a suit under the residual jurisdiction clause of § 1581(i). 
73 [d. at 1128-29. 
74 [d. at 1129. 
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Finally, Kokusai Electric Co., Ltd. v. United States75 presented the issue of whether 
a company should be permitted to intervene when the Department had re-
portedly refused to grant it "party to the proceeding" status during the antid-
umping investigation. The Department contended that the company did not 
qualify as an interested party (i.e., an importer) when it requested to be consid-
ered a "party to the proceeding" because it was not the importer of record. It 
later notified the Department that it had become the importer of record, but 
the Department claimed to have denied it that status because the deadline for 
requesting party status had elapsed. The Department could not produce a 
written denial of the later request, and the company filed briefs and appeared 
at the hearing during the investigation. 
The court granted the company's request to intervene. It held that regardless 
of the Department's view that the company had not satisfied its regulations, the 
company was deemed to have demonstrated "to the satisfaction of the Secretary 
good cause for intervention" pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 353.12(i)(4) in the absence 
of a Department denial of the company's request. The court noted the com-
pany's participation in the investigation, remarking that it was "not now at-
tempting to interject itself in the civil proceeding after sitting out the adminis-
trative proceeding."76 The court, however, carefully explained that "mere 
participation in the ITA hearing" did not automatically make the company a 
party to the proceeding. 77 It took into account the company's first timely request 
to become a party, albeit prior to its qualification as an interested party, noting 
that the time bar of 19 C.F.R. § 353.12(i) is not absolute. 
On balance, this decision is quite reasonable. The Department took a very 
narrow view of its definitions of "interested party" and "party to the proceeding" 
and failed to establish that it had ultimately denied the intervenor the latter 
classification. The company had actually participated in the administrative pro-
ceeding. Furthermore, the court took great pains to consider all of the relevant 
facts and the interests of the parties in arriving at its conclusion. 
D. Conclusion 
This body of relatively recent case law tells us several things about the CIT's 
interpretation of the statutory requirements regarding exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies and standing in appeals of the Department's antidumping and 
countervailing duty determinations. 
First, the lengthy discussion often devoted to the exhaustion requirement 
demonstrates significant respect for the doctrine. The court has not voiced the 
75 613 F. Supp. 1249 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985). 
76 [d. at 1252. 
77 [d. 
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view that its discretion is unfettered, nor has it dismissed the rule out of hand 
in any of these decisions. In this respect, the court's interpretation fits into the 
body of case law which developed and continues to apply the judicial doctrine 
of exhaustion. The court is not actively developing its own rules simply because 
the statute grants the court discretion. 
Second, Kokusai demonstrates that the court will apply the doctrine to prevent 
a claim, although it is the only decision of its kind that the CIT has recently 
made in an appeal of an antidumping or countervailing duty proceeding. The 
facts of the case present a rather extreme example of failing to exhaust admin-
istrative remedies, which leads to the possible conclusion that the CIT might 
only apply the exhaustion rule in the clearest of cases. On the other hand, many 
of the other decisions involve circumstances at the other end of the spectrum, 
for example, where the Department itself did not raise the exhaustion doctrine 
as a defense, or where the issue was legal rather than factual and based upon 
an intervening decision of the CIT. 
Third, the court is particularly apt to find that exhaustion is not required if 
there has been a decision of the CIT after the contested determination which 
affects the parties' rights. There is a sound basis for this exception in the 
precedent of other courts, including the Supreme Court. The CIT seems to be 
stretching the exception beyond its intended purpose, however, by invoking it 
in cases where the intervening court decision was issued in time for the plaintiff 
to bring it to the attention of the Department, or where the decision has nothing 
whatsoever in common with the gravamen of plaintiff's complaint, and only 
arguably affects the outcome of the case. 
Fourth, the CIT is extremely sensitive to where the equities lie, although it is 
sometimes too easily swayed by the pleas for help from the party asserting a 
claim. The court gives great attention to the potential effect of its decision upon 
the parties involved, which is both commendable and entirely consistent with 
the doctrine of exhaustion. On the other hand, the court sometimes fails to 
consider the big picture, forgetting that the doctrine is intended not only to 
permit the administrative body to carry out the functions it is statutorily required 
to perform, but also to promote a more efficient use of resources by everyone. 
Indeed, the court must not lose sight of the fundamental notion that the 
doctrine was created to address primarily the autonomy of the administrative 
agency and the efficiency of the judicial and administrative schemes. 
With respect to the requirement of standing, it is imperative that the court 
develop a clear definition of "interested party who was a party to the proceed-
ing" so that time and resources are not wasted through futile appeals and 
needless disputes over standing. So far the court's decisions seem to indicate 
that it interprets the definition with due discretion. With the exception of the 
decision in Miller, the court's decisions indicate that it does not plan to abuse 
that discretion by interpreting it too broadly. They also demonstrate that the 
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court IS most concerned with whether a plaintiff or an intervenor actually 
participated in the proceeding below so as to qualify it as a "party to the 
proceeding." 
The court is not, then, strictly following the definition of "party to the pro-
ceeding" contained in the Department's regulations, although it has given that 
definition considerable weight. It is very important that the court take note of 
the Department's characterization during the administrative proceeding of those 
who call themselves "parties to the proceeding" when they appear before the 
court. One reason is that the Department only allows parties to the proceeding 
to have access to business proprietary information received or created during 
the proceeding. If, for example, the court were to allow "Acme Imports" to 
bring suit or intervene in an action before the court, even though it was not 
considered a party to the Commerce proceeding, Acme will most likely have 
access to proprietary documents under a judicial protective order that it was 
not allowed to receive during the administrative proceeding. This leads one to 
question whether Acme exhausted its administrative remedies. If access to the 
information is required to pursue its claim in the litigation, that implies that it 
should also have applied to become a party to the proceeding at the adminis-
trative level, so that it could also have those documents and fully pursue its 
complaint before the Commerce Department. Such requests are normally 
granted as a matter of course, so long as the requester qualifies as an interested 
party, under Department regulations. 
III. MUST COMMERCE ACT WHEN THE CIT OVERTURNS A NEGATIVE 
PRELIMINARY INJURY FINDING BY THE ITC WHICH THE ITC ApPEALS? 
A. Introduction 
The Department of Commerce asserts that it is not, and should not be, 
required to resume an investigation when the CIT overturns a negative prelim-
inary injury finding made by the International Trade Commission (lTC), if the 
ITC is appealing the CIT decision. Certain members of the domestic industry 
disagree, and have filed actions designed to ensure that Commerce resumes its 
investigations after the ITC issues an affirmative injury determination pursuant 
to a remand.78 The Department's responsibility for conducting antidumping 
78 Various avenues have been used by plaintiffs to this end. For instance, in Armstrong Rubber Co. 
v. United States, No. 86-15, slip op. (February 14, 1986), the plaintiffs tried to have Commerce officials 
held in contempt for refusing to reinitiate a less than fair value investigation after an ITC negative 
preliminary injury determination was reversed and remanded by the CIT. The Department declined 
to reinitiate an investigation during the pendency of the lTC's appeal to the CAFC even though the 
ITC had issued an affirmative redetermination pursuant to the remand. Judge Watson in Armstrong 
refused to hold the Commerce officials in contempt: 
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duty and countervailing duty proceedings is dependent upon coterminous find-
ings of injury by the ITC.79 Absent a preliminary affirmative injury determi-
nation by the lTC, the Department cannot continue its investigation.80 The 
effect that a judicial decision has on an ITC preliminary determination is, 
therefore, crucial to the Department when assessing its statutory obligations to 
proceed with an investigation. 
The impact that this issue can have on the administrative proceedings of the 
Department of Commerce can be illustrated by the Department's investigation 
of iron construction castings. The domestic industry filed petitions with the 
Department and the ITC alleging that light and heavy iron construction castings 
Even though it may be said that the court [in the original suit] expected its judgments with 
respect to erroneous ITC determinations (determinations which had the effect of terminating 
investigations) to lead inexorably to the continuation of the investigation by the Commerce 
Department, it did not include a direction to that effect in its judgment .... Since making 
this motion for contempt, plaintiff has commenced a separate action to compel the Depart-
ment of Commerce to resume the investigation. The substance of the dispute will be reached 
in the new action. 
That "new action" was brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), and is still pending before the court. 
The Department does not agree with the substantive aspect of the action, although it does not contest 
the jurisdiction of the CIT to hear an appeal on the matter filed pursuant to § 1581(i). On the other 
hand, the Department contends that there is no right to request the CIT to issue a mandatory order 
pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1516a as part of an order affirming ITC remand results and directing 
Commerce to initiate an investigation based on the lTC's new affirmative injury finding since the issue 
is not appropriately before the court under those circumstances. (See government's brief in Bingham 
& Taylor v. United States, Court No. 85-07-00909). 
79 Title VII and section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 require an injury test in all antidumping cases 
and in all subsidy cases involving dutiable goods from countries which are members of the Subsidies 
Code of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or involving nondutiable goods from a country 
entitled to an injury test by the international obligations of the United States. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303, 
1671(b), 1673b. 
80 The statutory scheme is provided in 19 U.S.C. § 1671b (1984), which states in part: 
(a) DETERMINATION BY COMMISSION OF REASONABLE INDICATION OF IN-
JURY-Except in the case of a petition dismissed by the administering authority under section 
702(c)(3), the Commission ... shall make a determination ... of whether there is a reasonable 
indication that -
(I) an industry in the United States -
(A) is materially injured, or 
(B) is threatened with material injury, 
or 
(2) the establishment of an industry in the 
United States is materially retarded, 
by reason of imports of the merchandise which is the subject of the investigation by the 
administering authority. If that determination is negative, the investigation shaU be terminated. 
(emphasis added) 
(b) PRELIMINARY DETERMINATION BY ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY-Within 
85 days after the date on which a petition is filed under ~ection 702(b), or an investigation is 
commenced under section 702(a), but not before an affirmative determination by the Commis-
sion under subsection (a) of this section, the administering authority shall make a determi-
nation ... of whether there is a reasonable basis to believe or suspect that a subsidy is being 
provided with respect to the merchandise which is the subject of the investigation. If the 
determination of the administering authority under this subsection is affirmative, the deter-
mination shall include an estimate of the net subsidy. (emphasis added) 
See a!.<o 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a) and (b) (1986) for parallel antidumping provisions. 
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from Brazil, Canada, India, and the People's Republic of China were being sold 
in the United States at less than fair value (LTFV). The petitions also alleged 
that light and heavy iron construction castings imported from Brazil were being 
subsidized, and that these dumped and subsidized imports were causing or were 
threatening to cause material injury to a domestic industry. On July 3, 1985, 
the ITC published a preliminary determination that there was a reasonable 
indication that a domestic industry was being materially injured by reason of 
LTFV imports oflight and heavy iron construction castings from Brazil, Canada, 
India, and China.81 Additionally, the ITC determined that there was a reason-
able indication that the domestic industry was being materially injured by sub-
sidized imports of heavy iron construction castings from Brazil. At the same 
time, however, the ITC found that there was no reasonable indication of injury 
by reason of subsidized imports of light iron construction castings from Brazil. 
In reaching its varying preliminary determinations, the ITC cumulated the 
effects of LTFV imports from Brazil, Canada, India, and China, but it did not 
cross-cumulate these with the effects of the subsidized imports from Brazil. In 
consequence of the lTC's negative preliminary injury determination, the coun-
tervailing duty investigation of light iron construction castings from Brazil was 
terminated by operation of law. The ITA continued the countervailing duty 
investigation only of heavy iron construction castings. 
The domestic petitioners then instituted an action with the CIT. They alleged 
that the lTC's negative preliminary injury determination with respect to sub-
sidized imports of light iron construction castings from Brazil was not in accor-
dance with law or supported by substantial evidence. This was because the ITC 
had not cross-cumulated the effects of both the dumped and the subsidized 
imports in assessing the injury to the domestic industry.82 
The CIT issued a judgment in the action on February 14, 1986, holding that 
the ITC had erred in failing to cross-cumulate. The CIT remanded the matter 
for a redetermination consistent with the decision of the court.S' On remand, 
the ITC cross-cumulated the effects of the dumped imports with the subsidized 
imports and determined that a domestic industry was being materially injured 
by imports of subsidized light iron construction castings from Brazil.s4 In its 
redetermination, the ITC expressly reserved its right to appeal the judicial 
decision which had resulted in the affirmative redetermination. 
The ITC moved the court for an order affirming the agency's redetermina-
tion, which would serve as the basis for an appeal to the CAFC. In response to 
the lTC's motion, the plaintiffs requested for the first time that the court issue 
an order affirming the results of the remand, and directing the Department to 
81 50 Fed. Reg. 27,498 (1985). 
82 Bingham & Taylor v. United States, No. 85-07-00909, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade, June 2, 1986). 
83Id. 
84 51 Fed. Reg. 12,217 (1986). 
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initiate a countervailing duty investigation of light iron construction castings 
from Brazil. The Department opposed the plaintiffs' proposed order and the 
CIT did not adopt it when it affirmed the remand.85 
The issue of the Department's obligation in light of the lTC's appeal of the 
CIT order is, however, still unresolved. If the Department were to continue an 
investigation before a final order had been rendered, the agency would be 
moving forward with an investigation based on a contested ITC determination. 
Despite the fact that the lTC's affirmative preliminary injury determination is 
not final, the Department would be required to send out questionnaires to 
potential respondents, analyze responses, perform verifications, conceivably re-
quire the suspension, or liquidation, of entries, and make findings on all the 
issues raised by the parties regarding the importation of light iron construction 
castings from Brazil. 
The Department contends that, under these circumstances, the statute does 
not require the agency to resume an investigation when the CIT overturns a 
negative preliminary injury finding made by the ITC which the ITC is appeal-
ing. This conclusion is supported by the language of the Tariff Act of 1930 and 
the framework within which the antidumping and countervailing duty laws 
function with respect to the agencies and the courts. 
B. Discussion 
The statutory framework devised by Congress to govern the effect of admin-
istrative determinations while judicial review is underway is found in 19 U .S.C. 
§§ IS16a(c) and (e).86 The most telling aspect of these sections is the requirement 
85 Bingham, No. 85-07-00909. Since initial distribution of this paper, the CAFC has issued an opinion 
in Bingham & Taylor v. United States, No. 86-1440, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade, March 31, 1987) affirming 
the opinion of the CIT. Consequently, absent certification to the United States Supreme Court, the 
Department will proceed with its countervailing duty investigation of light iron construction castings 
from Brazil. 
86 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c) (1984) reads as follows: 
(c) LIQUIDATION OF ENTRIES-
(1) LIQUIDATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH DETERMINATION-Unless such liquida-
tion is enjoined by the court under paragraph (2) of this subsection, entries of merchandise 
of the character covered by a determination of the Secretary, the administering authority, or 
the Commission contested under subsection (a) shall be liquidated in accordance with the 
determination of the Secretary, the administering authority or the Commission, if they are 
entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or before the date of publication 
in the Federal Register by the Secretary or administering authority of a notice of a decision 
of the United States Court of International Trade, or of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit, not in harmony with that determination. Such notice of a decision 
shall be published within ten days from the date of the issuance of the court decision .... 
19 U.S.C. § 1516a(e) (1984) reads as follows: 
(e) LIQUIDATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FINAL DECISION-If the cause of 
action is sustained in whole or in part by a decision of the United States Court of International 
Trade or if the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit -
(I) entries of merchandise of the character covered by the published determination of the 
Secretary, the administering authority, or the Commission, which are entered, or withdrawn 
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that entries, absent an injunction, "shall be liquidated in accordance with the 
final court decision in the action."87 In other words, entries should not be subject 
to liquidation, suspension, and reliquidation every time a court rules with respect 
to those entries. Instead, the agency determination being challenged should 
remain in effect and govern the liquidation of the entries until all appeals have 
been decided. Accordingly, if a preliminary negative injury determination by 
the ITC has not been overturned by a final court decision, the Department 
cannot take action which would lead to the suspension of liquidation at a 
premature stage of the proceeding. The logic of this statutory scheme is seen 
in the effect it has on entries, on the parties, and on the Department's conduct 
of its investigations. 
C. Effect on Entries 
The statute's command that the Department refrain from continuing an 
investigation until a final court decision has been entered follows from the 
Congressional intent to prevent entries from facing the "yo-yo effect" of con-
stantly changing duty obligations and liquidations.88 For example, based on an 
underlying ITC preliminary negative injury determination, entries of the mer-
chandise investigated would not be subject to a suspension of liquidation. If, 
however, the Department were required to reinitiate an investigation based on 
the lTC's preliminary affirmative injury determination made pursuant to a 
remand decision which it appeals, the Department could issue an affirmative 
preliminary determination which would require the suspension of liquidation 
of the entries and the deposit of estimated duties. Following administrative 
review of these entries under either the "fast track" provisions of § 736(c) of 
the Act,89 which provide for review within 90 days after an antidumping duty 
order, or under the review-on-request provisions of § 751(a) of the Act,90 duties 
actually would be assessed on the entries. If at a later date the CAFC overturns 
the CIT's decision and upholds the lTC's original preliminary negative injury 
determination, administrative reviews of the order would still be required on 
all suspended entries made before the CIT reversed itself based on the CAFC 
from warehouse, for consumption after the date of publication in the Federal Register by the 
Secretary or the administering authority of a notice of the court decision, and 
(2) entries, the liquidation of which was enjoined under subsection (c)(2), shall be liquidated 
in accordance with the final court decision in the action. Such notice of the court decision 
shall be published within ten days from the date of the issuance of the court decision. 
87 19 U.S.C. 1516a(e) (1984) (emphasis added). 
88 See Melamine Chemicals, Inc. v. United States, 732 F.2d 924, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1984), which held 
that Congress could not have intended the "yo-yo effect" liquidations that could result from a CIT 
order controlling liquidations, that is later overturned on appeal, requiring the recommencement of 
the original administrative determination. 
89 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(c) (1986). 
90 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (1984). 
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order. In addition, no refund would be available for those entries on which 
duties had been assessed in the absence of an injunction.91 
Subjecting foreign companies to the burdens of an investigation with the 
possibility of suspended liquidations, final affirmative determinations by the 
ITC and Commerce, deposits of estimated duties, and perhaps even irreversible 
assessment of duties, only to have the CIT decision overturned by the CAFC 
at a later date, is not logical, nor is it supported by the statutory scheme. The 
underlying determination should not be disturbed during the pendency of 
litigation-until there is a "final court decision."92 That would be either a deci-
sion by the CIT that is not appealed or, if an appeal is taken, the completion 
of the appellate process. 
There is strong support for this interpretation of the Department's obligations 
under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a in the CAFC opinion in Melamine Chemicals, Inc. v. 
United States. 93 In Melamine the court determined that "[a]bsent an injunction, 
19 U.S.c. § 1516a requires that the challenged determination shall govern the 
liquidation of entries 'while the litigation is proceeding."'94 The CAFC over-
turned a CIT decision which rescinded a Commerce Department final negative 
determination because the court found that a CIT decision should not control 
liquidations, as the CIT did not have the authority to alter the administrative 
proceeding. The court held that the challenged Commerce negative final de-
termination should have governed the entries during the pendency of the 
litigation. The CAFC's reasoning and approach in Melamine is applicable as well 
to situations where there is an ITC negative preliminary injury determination. 
The challenged ITC negative injury finding, reviewable (as was the determi-
nation in Melamine) pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1516a, must govern the status of 
the proceeding during the pendency of the litigation. This avoids the "yo-yo 
effect" to which entries could be subjected if they are suspended as a result of 
a Commerce affirmative determination, and then perhaps released again after 
a CAFC decision upholding the challenged ITC negative injury finding. Under 
the statutory scheme, the Department should not be ordered to continue an 
investigation and alter its position with respect to merchandise subject to the 
91 See 19 U.S.C. § ISI6a(e) (1984). Also note that under this scenario. if the underlying dispute is 
over an ITC affirmative injury determination which the court reversed. obligating the Department to 
revoke the order. entries would be liquidated without reference to antidumping or countervailing 
duties. and such duties would never be collected on that merchandise. despite the fact that the 
affirmative finding might later be reinstated. 
92 19 U.S.C. ISI6a(e) (1984). 
93 732 F.2d 924 (1984). 
94 [d. at 934, citing S. REP. No. 96-249. 96th Cong .• 1st Sess. 248. reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS 381. 634. The Court of Appeals found that the administrative proceeding could be 
affected only by (I) a preliminary injunction pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § ISI6a(c)(2), or (2) a final court 
decision adjudicating the legality. vel non. of the challenged determination. !d. 
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litigation until either a final court decision on appeal has been issued, or all 
appeals have been withdrawn or dismissed.95 
D. Effect on the Parties and the Agency's Resources 
An interpretation of the statute which concludes that the Department should 
not change its position until a final court order has been entered adjudicating 
the underlying issues is fair for both domestic and foreign interests. For ex-
ample, the Department believes the law precludes its resuming an investigation 
after the ITC issues an affirmative preliminary determination reached solely in 
compliance with a remand subject to appeal. This may delay potential relief for 
the domestic industry. The Department, however, would also not act, for ex-
ample, to revoke an order if a CIT decision overturning a final affirmative ITC 
injury determination, which is changed to a negative determination as a result 
of remand, is being appealed.96 The Department would continue to enforce the 
order until judicial proceedings are complete. The order would not be revoked 
prematurely. The foreign respondents would still be liable to post any estimated 
95 Note, however, that in determining whether the court was mandated to issue a stay pending an 
appeal of a CIT decision in Badger-Powhatan, Inc. v. United States, No. 86-68, slip op. (Ct. Int'l 
Trade, June 27, 1986), the CIT held that Melamine could not be interpreted as preventing an agency 
from changing its final determination subject to a CAFC decision on appeal. Instead, Judge Restani 
believed Melamine to be applicable only to the question before it involving whether a negative deter-
mination of the agency should govern the process of liquidation pending appeal of a decision rescind-
ing the determination. The finality aspect of Melamine was not deemed applicable to the situation in 
Badger-Powhatan because in the latter case neither the determination by the ITC nor that of the ITA 
would lead to immediate liquidation of the entries-duties could not have been assessed until after 
the first administrative review. 
Similarly, in the situation discussed in this paper, liquidation could not occur immediately after the 
ITA resumed its investigation since assessment does not occur until an administrative review. Thus, 
some might rely on the dictum in Badger-Powhatan to argue that since liquidation is not imminent, the 
agency is required to continue its investigation after an ITC determination made pursuant to a remand 
order which is appealed. 
We believe such reliance would be mi3placed. The factual situation was an odd one. After petitioner 
sued, Commerce asked for a remand, having come to the view that petitioner's contention was sound. 
The foreign manufacturer opposed the remand, Badger-Powhatan v. United States, No. 86-38 slip 
op. (Ct. Int'l Trade, April 2, 1986), and, when the CIT granted the agency's motion, moved to stay 
the remand pending appeal. Judge Restani found that, under these circumstances, even a broad 
reading of Melamine did not justify a stay because the most recent determination of the agency-to 
recalculate dumping margins based on its altered position-would in fact govern entries pending 
appeal. Badger-Powhatan v. United States, No. 86-68 slip op. at 6 (Ct. Int'I Trade, June 27, 1986). 
The court has in essence held here nothing more than that the agency is entitled to change its mind 
when it has been challenged and the issue is the subject of the appeal. 
96 See Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1984). In this case the CAFC 
reversed the lower court's finding of insubstantial ev;dence on the record to support the final ITC 
material injury determination, reinstated the determination, and ordered that the resulting antidump-
ing order be reinstated as well. In fact, the ITA had never revoked this order when the CIT overturned 
the lTC's final affirmative injury finding. 
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deposits which the Department had determined were due, and the interests of 
the domestic industry would, in this case, be secured. 
Thus, as the prior examples illustrate, the nonresumption of investigations 
until a final court decision has been handed down does not discriminate among, 
or favor, the domestic industry, the importers, or the foreign producers. 
If the Department were to resume an investigation or revoke an order based 
upon an unsettled decision of the lTC, at least three proceedings could simul-
taneously affect the merchandise in the short run: the court case, the Commerce 
investigation, and the ITC investigation. Any of these, after a CAFC decision, 
could be mooted. The parties would be required to follow the court case on 
appeal and argue the validity or nonvalidity of the lTC's initial determinations. 
In addition, the parties would be required to argue the merits of the Commerce 
Department's continuing investigation based on an ITC determination which 
could be overturned. Finally, they would be required to follow a continuing 
ITC investigation conducted under protest, which is further complicated by the 
uncertainties of the appellate proceeding. Instead, by refusing to change its 
position until the underlying judicial proceedings are final, the Department will 
simplify the administrative proceeding and allow interested parties to follow 
the appeal to its completion, and thereafter determine where their interests and 
liabilities lie. 
It is also necessary, when assessing the Department's obligations, to consider 
the fact that the resumption of an investigation while the ITC continues to 
appeal a CIT decision requires the unnecessary expenditure of scarce public 
resources if the ITC ultimately prevails. Continuing the investigation includes 
the preparation of questionnaires, analysis of responses, verification of re-
sponses, preparation and publication of determinations, and possibly defense 
of any ensuing litigation. Yet, if the ITC appeal was upheld, the Department 
would have used taxpayer resources to conduct a useless investigation which 
Congress determined should have halted after an ITC negative preliminary 
injury determination.97 
The expenditure of Commerce Department (and ITC) resources for this type 
of exercise is not limited to one anomalous case. The Department's obligations, 
in the face of disputed ITC preliminary determinations, have been an issue in 
no fewer than ten investigations since 1984.98 In each of these cases the CIT 
97 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
98 A review of recent investigations discloses three thin sheet glass cases from Switzerland, Belgium, 
and the Federal Republic of Germany (jeannette Sheet Glass Corp. v. United States, No. 85-2554, 
slip op. (Ct. Int'I Trade, June 2, 1986»; two antidumping and two countervailing duty investigations 
involving wine from France and Italy (American Grape Growers Alliance v. United States, No. 85-
104, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade, October 7, 1985»; one antidumping investigation involving radial tires 
from Korea (Armstrong Rubber Co. v. United States, No. 86-15, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade, February 
28, 1986»; and one countervailing duty investigation on light iron construction castings from Brazil 
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overturned a negative preliminary determination by the ITC. A departmental 
investigation of these ten cases, based on a controverted preliminary determi-
nation, would not only waste the agency's limited resources on investigations 
and reviews that might be overturned before they are finished, but also create 
chaos for the parties which must attempt to evaluate their position while con-
fronted with the obligations imposed by the agencies and the courts pursuant 
to the most current interpretation of the antidumping and countervailing duty 
laws. 
In sum, the negative consequences from resumption of an investigation absent 
a final court decision support the Department's interpretation of its obligations 
under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a in light of an ITC affirmative injury determination 
subject to appeal. The judicial precedent, both directly and by analogy, supports 
the agency's interpretation. The counterargument is that there is a greater 
interest in an expeditious continuation of the investigation. This is not persua-
sive, however, because the statutory prerequisite of an affirmative preliminary 
injury determination by the ITC issued before the Department issues its prelim-
inary determination, does not exist. 
IV. WHEN SHOULD COMMERCE BE REQUIRED TO PERFORM A REMAND PRIOR TO 
ApPEAL? 
A. Introduction 
Recent decisions have circumscribed the Department's right to appeal a CIT 
decision to the CAFC before completing a CIT remand.99 The Department 
argues that it has a right, in many instances, to appeal a CIT decision prior to 
performing a remand, and thus that a stay of the remand should issue in the 
interim. The CAFC, however, has concluded that a trial court remand to the 
administrative agency for additional findings is not appealable as of right, even 
though the order resolves the central legal issue. Further, the CIT has in recent 
decisions denied the agency's motions for a stay of the remand. 
The Department does not view the dispute over the "timing" of an appeal as 
an academic matter, because of the implications of a denial of early appellate 
review for administration of the statute. For instance, the agency may be re-
quired, pursuant to a remand, not only to recalculate a dumping margin, but 
also to abandon a prior calculation methodology and instead use a method 
which the CIT has deemed in its order to be more reasonable. If this remand 
(Bingham & Taylor, Inc. v. United States, No. 85-07-00909, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade, February 14, 
1986), a/I'd, No. 86-1440, slip op. (Fed. Cir. 1987». 
99 Cabot Corp. v. United States, No. 86-720, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade, April 9, 1986). An appeal from 
a CIT decision before completion of the remand in Philipp Brothers, Inc. v. United States, No. 86-
67, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade, June 27, 1986), was also denied in an unpublished opinion by the CAFC. 
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were not appealable immediately, the Department would be forced to issue a 
new dumping determination which it would not view as correctly decided. If 
the dumping margin calculated under the new methodology did not alter the 
size of the dumping margin originally determined, the Department's opportu-
nity to appeal the decision on methodology after the CIT affirmed the Depart-
ment's remand results could be precluded as moot. In these circumstances, 
parties might argue that the Department is obligated to use this court-ordered 
methodology in other investigations even though the Department considers the 
method unsupported by the statute, and even though it lost the opportunity to 
appeal the validity of the court decision. 
The above example illustrates merely one of the problems the agency can 
confront when either determinations are remanded by the CIT without granting 
appellate review, or a stay is denied in the interim. The agency may lose its 
right to appeal certain issues. Additionally, it may be required to issue new 
orders which could immediately affect the positions of the parties to the un-
derlying proceedings. Finally, it could even be required to expend its resources 
to satisfy a remand, which itself could be overturned upon later appellate review. 
Of course, in most instances a remand is entirely appropriate and should be 
completed in an expeditious manner. In other instances, however, as exempli-
fied above, the possible negative consequences of immediate compliance with a 
remand order make the timing of appellate court review of CIT decisions of 
critical importance to the agency and to those whose interests are affected by 
agency decisions. 
B. Discussion 
The CAFC has "exclusive jurisdiction ... of an appeal from a final decision 
of the United States Court of International Trade."lOo The sticking point of this 
provision is the meaning of the term "final decision." The CAFC in Cabot Corp. 
v. United States held to a very strict interpretation of the requirement of finality 
explaining that: 
It helps preserve the respect due trial judges by minimizing appel-
late-court interference with the numerous decisions they must make 
in the prejudgment stages of litigation. It reduces the ability of 
litigants to harass opponents and to clog the courts through a succes-
sion of costly and time-consuming appeals. It is crucial to the effi-
cient administration of justice. IOI 
100 28 U.S.C. 1295(a)(5) (1984). 
101 Cabot, No. 86-720, slip op. at 5 (Ct. Int'l Trade, April 9, 1986) (citing Flanagan v. United States, 
465 U.S. 259, 263-64 (1984)); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981). 
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Further, the court in Cabot cited to a corollary rule "that an order remanding a 
matter to an administrative agency for further findings and proceedings is not 
final." 102 
While the CAFC's deference to finality is a fundamental piece in the puzzle 
of judicial proceedings, there are strong arguments for utilizing a more prag-
matic approach to the finality requirement where the potential appeal is from 
a remand order. A CIT decision that consists of a remand to the agency for 
further proceedings is a decision which, more frequently than not, has ruled 
on a substantive issue unfavorably for the agency and requires further agency 
action in light of that determination. l03 By complying with the terms of the 
remand, the agency is changing the substance of its administrative determina-
tion before it has had an opportunity to appeal the CIT's ruling on the very 
issues at stake in the litigation. Yet, if the agency were to refuse to comply with 
the terms of the remand it would be subject to contempt. 
Therefore, the agency is required to complete an administrative proceeding 
based on underlying methodologies or factors with which it does not agree. 
This may require new information, verification, responses, comments, and cal-
culation to reach a determination which it may appeal and may win, or as 
illustrated earlier, from which it may have no opportunity to appeal, once the 
CIT has ruled on the final results of remand. 104 Arguably, "finality" was reached 
in a pragmatic sense when the CIT first issued its decision on the substantive 
issue. This conclusion is supported by decisions of the Supreme Court and the 
Courts of Appeals for the Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia circuits. l05 
This lengthening line of decisions adopting a pragmatic approach to finality 
has held, under the authority of Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp. ,106 and Cohen 
102 Cabot, No. 86-270, slip op. at 5. 
103 It may also consist of a substantive determination with respect to certain of the counts, and 
remand for a redetermination or explanation as to others, or be a remand solely for recalculation or 
explanation. 
104 For example, in Philipp Brothers v. United States, No. 86-67, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade, June 27, 
1986), the Department lost the right to appeal what it considered a very fundamental issue-the 
appropriate application of the traditional administrative law principle of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies. Because the CAFC denied the Department's appeal from the CIT's remand order, the 
Department completed the remand. The basis for an appeal by the Department became moot when 
the Department's determination on the issue, which plaintiff failed to argue to the agency during the 
administrative proceeding, was upheld. Id. The only relief the Department could request from the 
CAFC would be a decision which reversed the CIT in concept, but not in fact. In consequence, a CIT 
decision which the Department argues undermines the careful administrative procedure which Con-
gress provided for when it gave the agency the authority to conduct the investigation in the first place, 
could remain as precedent without challenge. 
105 See Regents of University of California v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1985); Stone v. Heckler, 
722 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1983); Paluso v. Matthews, 573 F.2d 4 (10th Cir. 1978); Gueory v. Hampton, 
510 F.2d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
106 379 U.S. 148 (1964). 
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v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,107 that the "requirement of finality is to be 
given a 'practical rather than a technical construction."'loB Instead of applying 
a blanket rule with respect to the finality of remands, these opinions hold that 
a remand order is final and appealable if (1) it has decided the controlling law 
of the case, (2) a result of the remand will be to preclude later appellate review 
of the controlling legal issue, or (3) the ruling involves an issue of far-reaching 
consequences which will affect a large number of claimants. Unfortunately, the 
CAFC has not yet accepted this approach to remands. Nor has the CAFC been 
willing to entertain appeals from a remanded decision under an alternative 
avenue-the collateral order doctrine. 109 
The approach the CAFC has suggested as appropriate for appeal of a remand 
order is a request for certification for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(d)(l). The Department has in the past had appeals of CIT remand 
orders certified to the CAFC.llo A certification for appeal is discretionary with 
the CIT. Certification would not be appropriate in cases where the agency on 
remand is merely required to perform further calculations, issue a clarification 
of the record, or explain the agency's actions. Frequently, however, a remand 
decision will in itself decide a controlling issue of law. In those cases, the agency 
will not only desire an immediate interlocutory appeal, but will also likely request 
a stay of the remand. 
There are compelling reasons for granting an interlocutory appeal and a stay 
of the remand. Plaintiffs and the court will by necessity focus on a single agency 
determination affecting particular merchandise from one country. However, 
the court's views on controlling legal issues immediately affect literally dozens 
of other ongoing investigations and administrative reviews. Further, the court's 
opinion has an impact on domestic industries' preparation of antidumping and 
countervailing duty petitions, as well as on governments and companies in many 
107 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
108 Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial 
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)). 
109 See Cabot Corp. v. United States, No. 86-720, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade, April 9, 1986). As described 
in Cabot, the "collateral order" exception covers orders which "finally determine claims of right 
separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and 
too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole 
case is adjudicated." Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). To come 
within the exception, the order must at a minimum "conclusively determine the disputed question," 
"resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action," and "be effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 
(1978). The CAFC did not find the collateral order exception applicable to the facts in Cabot. The 
appeal from Philipp Brothers, denied by the CAFC, was also based in the alternative on the collateral 
order doctrine. 
110 See, e.g., Silver Reed America, Inc. v. United States, 581 F. Supp. 1290 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) 
rev'd, rem. sub nom. SCM Corp. Consumer Products Div. v. Silver Reed America, Inc., 753 F.2d 1033 
(Fed. Cir. 1985). 
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countries that are attempting to ensure that their exports to the United States 
will not be be subject to antidumping and countervailing duties. This enormous 
expenditure of resources necessarily occasioned by a far-reaching judicial de-
cision, which the parties have not had the opportunity to appeal, is often of far 
greater concern than the harm to the plaintiff of a possible delay in relief as a 
result of immediate appeal and a stay of the remand. 
A party may be entitled to a discretionary stay pursuant to Rule 62(d) of the 
CIT, which provides in part that "when an appeal is taken, the appellant ... 
may obtain a stay .... "111 In determining whether to issue a discretionary stay 
pending appeal, the trial court generally uses a four-part burden analysis. The 
factors considered by the court are (1) whether the petitioner is likely to prevail 
on the merits of the appeal, (2) whether, without a stay, the petitioner will be 
irreparably injured, (3) whether issuance of a stay will substantially harm other 
parties interested in the proceeding, and (4) wherein lies the public interest. ll2 
Most courts give the first factor little weight since it in effect requires the trial 
court to second-guess the validity of its own original holding.1!3 With respect to 
the second factor, whether the petitioner will be irreparably injured, where the 
petitioner is the agency, the most frequent harm to the agency is the adminis-
trative expenditure of time and money on what can often prove to be a useless 
task. Every remand removes administrative personnel from other cases pending 
before the agency in order to comply with the remand instructions and concerns 
of the court. The agency's own concerns are subordinated to this task which 
may prove to be moot after an appellate decision. Additionally, if the court 
orders the agency to continue with the remand, rather than allowing an appeal 
or granting a stay, the agency may lose the chance to litigate the issue. 
This occurred in Jeannette Sheet Glass Corp. v. United States. 114 The ITC ap-
pealed a CIT decision affirming the lTC's preliminary affirmative injury de-
termination made pursuant to the CIT's remand of the lTC's original negative 
preliminary determination. The CAFC dismissed this appeal because it was not 
from a "final" order under 28 U.s.C. § 1295(a)(6). While the CAFC opinion 
was not published and may not be cited as precedent, it does raise questions as 
to the extent of an agency's right to appeal a CIT decision upholding an agency 
remand. The possibility exists that, once the Department completes its remand 
incorporating the disputed issue, an agency appeal will, according to the CAFC, 
111 CT. INT'L TRADE R. 62(d). 
I I' See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
II' See American Grape Growers Alliance for Fair Trade v. United States, No. 85-104, slip op. at 5 
(Ct. Int'I Trade, Oct. 7. 1985). 
114 Appeal No. 85-2554 (Ct. Int'I Trade. June 2. 1986). 
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be moot. Therefore, the agency, as petItIOner for a stay, can face potential 
irreparable injury due to the lack of opportunity to appeal its claim. 
The third factor, the harm to other parties interested in the proceeding, will 
vary considerably depending on the facts of each case. If, after an affirmative 
determination, suspension of liquidation is enjoined, neither the interests of the 
importers nor of the domestic parties will be impaired by a stay. Importers will 
not have their merchandise liquidated at a disputed rate, and the domestic 
industry's interests will be protected by the suspension and cash deposit. How-
ever, if the dispute arises from a negative determination which, after the re-
mand, could become affirmative, the domestic industry may be harmed as it 
awaits relief that it might have obtained by an affirmative determination and 
imposition of duties. 
The last factor, that of the public interest, is a rather amorphous concept. Its 
evaluation provides the court, by its nature, a good deal of discretion. Courts 
have found that there is some public interest in denying stays pending appeal 
"because they interrupt the ordinary process of judicial review and postpone 
relief for the prevailing party."115 In particular, Judge Restani in Philipp Brothers 
placed a strong emphasis on the public's interest in an expeditious resolution 
of a proceeding. ll6 
An interest in expediency, however, may be outweighed by other considera-
tions, such as the resolution of the underlying issues. All participants in an 
antidumping or countervailing duty case are affected by the continuation of 
administrative proceedings, while the administrative standard is on appeal. The 
uncertainty created when controlling issues of law are not finally resolved also 
creates chaos for the agency in other reviews, as it must decide which standard 
to follow as a result of pending litigation. This makes it difficult for other parties 
to assess their own position vis-a-vis the agency's obligations. The public may 
have an interest in the stability of a stay of the proceedings until the underlying 
issues are finally resolved. At least recently, the CIT has not accorded due 
weight to this factor, which in many ways is unique to the antidumping and 
countervailing duty area. 
115 Dellums v. Smith, 577 F. Supp. 1456, 1457 (N.D. Cal. 1984); see also Badger-Powhatan, No. 86-
68, slip op. at 13 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986); Philipp Brothers, No. 86-67, slip op. at 12 (Ct. Int'l Trade 
1986). 
116 Judge Restani seemed to find support for expediency in the continuation of the administrative 
proceeding not only from the twelve month statutory time period provided for administrative review 
determinations in section 1675(a)(l) of the Tariff Act of 1930, but also in the much shorter time 
restrictions imposed in the investigative stages of the proceeding which allow additional time only in 
"extraordinarily complicated cases." Note, however, that deadlines which apply to the original inves-
tigation are by their terms not applicable to the administrative review proceeding in question in Philipp 
Brothers. 
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C. Conclusion 
A party need not appeal every remand order with which it does not agree, 
nor is a stay warranted in every case. However, when a remand order decides 
a controlling issue of law and there is a substantial risk that the issue will escape 
review absent an appeal prior to completion of the remand, or when the agency 
or parties would be unduly burdened by completion of the remand prior to 
appellate review, an appeal from this "final judgment" or collateral order, or, 
alternatively, an interlocutory appeal through certification, as well as a stay of 
the remand pending review, should be granted. In using its discretion to grant 
or deny review, the court must consider the terms of the scheme for appellate 
review provided by Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 1295, as well as the substantial 
interest in the fair and efficient conduct of the administrative process with 
which the agency is entrusted. 
V. ARE REMAND RESULTS SUBJECT TO CHALLENGE ANEW? 
A. Introduction 
Traditionally, the Department of Commerce I 17 has believed that a well-estab-
lished scheme governed the circumstances in which parties to antidumping and 
countervailing duty proceedings could seek judicial review of final administra-
tive determinations in those proceedings. In Commerce's view, the scheme was 
as follows: A partyllB adversely affected by a final determination was required 
to bring an action in the CIT within thirty days of its publication in the Federal 
Register. llg Once one party had initiated a challenge in the CIT, other interested 
parties who wished to contest the issues raised in that action, or to protect their 
interests by supporting the Department's position, were required to intervene 
in order to preserve these rights. 120 Parties who wished to raise issues not already 
before the CIT were required to commence a separate action within the original 
thirty-day deadline.l2l If the CIT remanded the determination to Commerce 
for further consideration, the CIT retained jurisdiction over the issues re-
manded until the remand results were reported back to that court. Thus, there 
was no final, appealable decision until the CIT either affirmed or overturned 
the remand results. In Commerce's view, it followed that parties to an admin-
117 More precisely, the Office of the Deputy Chief Counsel for Import Administration. 
118 The term "party" refers to an "interested party" who is also a "party to the proceeding" as those 
two terms are defined in 19 C.F.R. 353.12(c) and (i) and 355.7(c) and (i). 
Ilg Royal Business Machines v. United States, 669 F.2d 692 (Fed. Cir. 1982). 
120 The CIT has been liberal regarding the circumstances in which intervention is permitted. See 
CT. INT'L TRADE R. 13. See also Silver Reed America, Inc. v. United States, 600 F. Supp. 846 (Ct. Int'l 
Trade 1984). 
121 Funi Electric Co. v. United States, 595 F. Supp. 1152, 1153 (Ct. 1nt'1 Trade 1984); Nakajima All 
Co. v. United States, 2 Ct. Int'l. Trade 170 (1981). 
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istrative proceeding who did not become parties to a CIT suit arising from that 
proceeding could not later challenge Commerce's determination on remand. 122 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in Freeport Minerals Co. v. United States 123 
shook Commerce's understanding of this whole scheme. In Freeport the CAFC 
not only permitted a domestic interested party to challenge a final determination 
of antidumping duties in an administrative review almost a year after that 
determination was published,124 but also seemed to say that the CIT lost juris-
diction over the action on the remand to the Department of Commerce. 125 In 
consequence, the plaintiff was permitted to challenge in the CIT the September 
1983 remand results of an August 1982 suit even though the plaintiff had never 
intervened in that suit. To Commerce, this result seemed to prop open the door 
to judicial review in the CIT permanently, and threatened to nullify the finality 
of its administrative determinations. 
Later opinions of the CAFC and the CIT have clarified the issues to some 
extent and suggest that the scheme as originally viewed by Commerce has been 
revised rather than replaced. This section describes the decisions which have 
brought about that revision, and presents Commerce's current view of the rules 
governing remand results. 
B. The Freeport Decision 
Freeport arose out of an antidumping duty order on sulphur from Canada 
issued by the Treasury Department in 1973 (the "sulphur order"}.126 Shortly 
after Commerce assumed responsibility for administering the antidumping laws 
in 1980, it initiated a review of imports from five of the approximately fifty 
Canadian sulphur exporters, covering mainly the period from January 1, 1976, 
through February 8, 1979.127 In April 1981 Commerce published the prelimi-
nary results of this review, finding no imports at less than foreign market value 
(FMV) during the review period for any of the five exporters, and announcing 
its intention to revoke the sulphur order with respect to all of them as of 
February 8, 1979.128 
In January 1982, Commerce published the final results of its review with 
respect to two of the five exporters, confirming the absence of less-than-FMV 
122 As provided in 19 u.s.c. § 1515a(c)(3). 
123 758 F.2d 629 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
124 [d. at 633. 
125 [d. at 636. 
126 38 Fed. Reg. 34.655 (1973). 
127 For Canadian Superior Oil. Ltd .• the period reviewed was from July I. 1976. through February 
8. 1979. For Gulf Oil Canada. Ltd .• Houston's Bay Oil & Gas. Ltd .• Chevron Standard. Ltd .• and Shell 
Canada (with the exception of one sale) the period reviewed was from January I. 1976. through 
February 8. 1979. 
128 46 Fed. Reg. 21.214 (1981). 
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sales during the review period. 129 Freeport Minerals, a domestic interested party, 
promptly challenged this determination in the CIT. 130 
In July 1982, Commerce published the final results of its review with respect 
to the other three exporters, including Chevron Standard. 131 This notice con-
firmed the absence of less-than-FMV sales by these three exporters during the 
review period. Commerce announced, however, that it was exercising its discre-
tion to postpone revocation of the sulphur order with respect to them until 
they persuaded a fourth Canadian company, Cansulex Ltd., of which they were 
significant shareholders, to furnish the Department with data it had long sought 
regarding Cansulex's sales of sulphur in third countries. Chevron promptly 
challenged this postponement in the CIT.132 Freeport neither challenged Com-
merce's final determination of no less-than-FMV sales for the three companies. 
nor sought to intervene on the Department's side in Chevron's challenge to the 
postponement of revocation. 
In May 1983, the CIT ruled that Cansulex's failure to furnish information 
on third country sales was irrelevant to Chevron's review and was not a per-
missible basis for postponing revocation of the sulphur order.133 The court 
therefore remanded the case to Commerce with instructions to make a new 
determination on Chevron's revocation, without taking Cansulex's conduct into 
account. 134 Commerce duly submitted a remand determination to the CIT in 
June 1983, which announced revocation of the sulphur order as to Chevron. 
The CIT then affirmed the revocation, and also affirmed its implicit basis--
Commerce's determination of no less-than-FMV sales during the review pe-
riod. 135 Commerce published a notice of final revocation of the sulphur order 
with respect to Chevron in September 1983.136 
Shortly thereafter, Freeport brought an action in the CIT contesting the final 
revocation. 137 Freeport's action raised a number of issues unique to the final 
revocation order, but it also challenged, for the first time, the process by which 
Commerce reached its July 1982 determination that Chevron's margin during 
the review period was zero.138 Freeport brought the action under 19 U.S.C. 
129 47 Fed. Reg. 3,812 (1982). 
'"0 This action resulted in the CIT's decision in Freeport Minerals Co. v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 
1246, rev'd, 776 F.2d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
131 47 Fed. Reg. 31,911 (1982). 
lS2 Chevron commenced its action by filing a summons on August 20, 1982. 
ISS Chevron Standard Ltd. v. United States, 563 F. Supp. 1381 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983). 
134 [d. at 1384. 
135 Chevron Standard Ltd. v. United States, 5 Ct. Int'l Trade 260 (1983). The issue of whether there 
had been less-than-FMV sales was never raised in the court proceedings. 
IS648 Fed. Reg. 40,760 (1983). 
IS7 Freeport's summons was filed in the CIT on, or about, October 8, 1983. The complaint was filed 
on, or about, October 31, 1983. 
138 Final revocation was based on a tentative revocation issued by the Treasury Department on 
February 8, 1979,44 Fed. Reg. 8,057 (1979). Freeport disputed Commerce's refusal to grant it access 
to materials relating to Treasury's tentative revocation. 
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1516a(a)(2),139 which requires challenges to determinations in administrative 
reviews[40 to be brought within thirty days of their publication in the Federal 
Register. Freeport therefore characterized its action entirely as an appeal of 
Commerce's September 1983 final revocation, properly brought in October 
1983. 
Commerce disagreed. In its view, a final determination that Chevron's margin 
for the review period was zero had been published in July 1982, and Freeport 
was barred from contesting that determination after August 1982. Commerce 
also maintained that, since Chevron had brought an action which raised the 
merits of revocation and the CIT had ruled on that issue, Freeport had lost its 
right to contest that issue by failing to intervene in Chevron's action.['[ 
The Court of International Trade agreed with Commerce, and dismissed 
Freeport's action as out of time.['2 The CIT ruled that Freeport's action was 
also barred as a collateral attack on its June 1983 affirmance of the remand 
result in Chevron, since Freeport had never become a party to that action. [,3 In 
effect, the CIT found that the validity of the margin had been raised in Chev-
ron's challenge to the postponement of revocation, so that Freeport was then 
barred from challenging either determination.[" 
139 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2) provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Review of determinations on the record -
(A) In general-Within thirty days after 
(i) the date of publication in the Federal Register of -
(I)notice of any determination described in clause (ii). (iii). (iv), or (v) of subparagraph 
(B), or 
(II)an antidumping ... order based upon any determination described in clause (i) 
of subparagraph (B), 
an interested party who is a party to the proceeding ... may commence an action [in the 
CIT] .... 
(B) Reviewable determinations-The determinations which may be contested under subpar-
agraph (A) are as follows: 
(i) Final affirmative determinations ... under section ... 1673(d) of this title [§ 735 
of the Tariff Act of 1930J. 
(ii)A final negative determination ... under section ... 1673(d) of this title. 
(iii) A final determination ... under section 1675 of this title. 
140 Administrative reviews are governed by section 751 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1675 
(1984), as amended, which provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Administrative review of determinations 
(a) Periodic review of amount of duty -
(I) In general-At least once during each 12-month period beginning on the anniversary 
of the date of publication of ... an antidumping duty order under this title, ... the admin-
istering authority, if a request for such a review has been received ... shall -
(B) review, and determine ... the amount of any antidumping duty ... 
and shall publish the results of such review ... in the Federal Register. 
141 Reply Brief in Support of Defendant-Intervenor's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (Mar. 2. 
1984), Freeport Minerals Co. v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 586 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984). 
142 Freeport Minerals Co. v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 586 (Ct. Int'I Trade 1984). 
143 [d. at 590. 
144 !d. The CIT appeared to find that, to the extent the merits of Commerce's July 1982 determi-
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Freeport appealed to the CAFC, which reversed the CIT's decision. 145 Free-
port argued before the CAFC that it had not been required to appeal the 
revocation in July 1982 since there had been no final determination on revo-
cation until September 1983. Freeport contended that a 1982 appeal would 
have made no sense because of Commerce's favorable ruling, and would have 
wasted judicial and legal resources. 146 The Government countered that zero 
margins are not favorable to domestic parties. It pointed out that domestic 
parties regularly challenge such margins in the CIT within thirty days, as they 
are bound to do under the Act, notwithstanding that zero margins routinely do 
not result in final revocation of the antidumping order in question. 
The CAFC agreed with Freeport and held that, since Freeport filed its appeal 
within the thirty-day limit, its October 1983 action was not out of time. 147 Implicit 
in this ruling is that issues regarding the basis for revocation should be raised, 
not in a challenge to a determination on margins in the administrative review 
(as the CIT had in effect ruled), but rather in a challenge to the final deter-
mination on revocation. The CAFC also rejected the CIT's theory that Free-
port's challenge to the revocation order was impermissible as a collateral at-
tack. 148 The Court adopted Freeport's view that the CIT's June 1983 order was 
limited solely to the issue of Commerce's postponement of revocation, and that 
Freeport therefore could not be collaterally estopped from challenging the 
revocation on other grounds. l49 
Finally, the CAFC rejected Chevron's argument that Freeport could not chal-
lenge the final revocation since it was simply the result on remand of Chevron's 
1982 suit, to which Freeport had never been a party. The court ruled that the 
final revocation was an independent determination, which could therefore serve 
as the basis for a separate cause of action. 150 
nation of no less-than-FMV sales had not been at issue in the original action, they had been raised 
when the court remanded the case. The CIT pointed out that its order of remand had directed 
Commerce to make a determination in the final results of its administrative review consistent with the 
facts ascertained from its dumping investigation and relation to sales at not less than fair value. 
145 758 F.2d 629 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
146 [d. at 633. 
147 The CAFC held that Commerce's September 1983 revocation was a determination to revoke 
under section 1675 and therefore was reviewable under section 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii), while the findings 
underlying that determination were reviewable as provided iri section 1516a(a)(2)(A)(i). [d. Since 
subsection (A)(i) refers to subsection (B)(iii), it would appear that the CAFC ruled that both the July 
1982 notice and the September 1983 notice were appealable as provided in section 1516a(a)(2)(A)(i). 
Such an interpretation, however, renders meaningless the statutory thirty day time limit on the first 
opportunity to appeal. (References hereinafter to Freeport refer to this CAFC decision). 
148 The CIT had reasoned that, since its June 1983 affirmation of the revocation in Chevron, had 
also affirmed the basis for the revocation (the zero margin), Freeport's failure to intervene in Chevron 
barred it from raising that issue in a different action. 
149 758 F.2d at 638. This holding contradicted the CIT's express statement that it was upholding the 
basis for the revocation, including Commerce's determinations of zero margins. 
150 [d. at 636. 
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1. Comment on Freeport 
Much of the confusion in Freeport seems to have resulted from analyzing 
Commerce's determination of a zero margin for Chevron in the administrative 
review and its determination to revoke the sulphur order with respect to Chev-
ron as one determination. Although a finding of zero (or de minimis) margins is 
one precondition to revocation, the two determinations are distinct. 151 Aside 
from the analytical question, importers have a legitimate expectation that their 
entries of merchandise will be liquidated, and administrative reviews of entries 
subject to antidumping orders must be performed regardless of whether or not 
they lead to revocation. The margins determined in administrative reviews may 
therefore be challenged independently of any related determinations regarding 
revocation. 
Not only are the results of administrative reviews and determinations regard-
ing revocation distinct, but the outcome in Freeport of the disputes over timeli-
ness and collateral attack should have been different with regard to each. With 
respect to timeliness, for example, Freeport's challenge to the July 1982 deter-
mination of zero margins should have been made by August 1982 and was 
therefore out of time by October 1983. Freeport was correct, however, in raising 
issues unique to the final revocation (such as the likelihood of resumed sales at 
less-than-FMV) in October 1983. This is because no final determination on 
these issues was published by Commerce until September 1983. 152 With respect 
to collateral estoppel, Freeport's suit should have been barred to the extent it 
raised issues decided by the CIT in Chevron (such as the propriety of delay). 
But Freeport should have been free to contest issues not decided in Chevron, 
provided they were neither integral to Chevron's cause of action nor out of 
time. 
Both courts' efforts would have been better spent deciding whether the 
margin determined in the administrative review was so integral to Chevron's 
suit that Freeport was compelled to raise that issue on intervention or not at 
all. In effect, the CIT ruled that the margin was integral to Chevron's suit, 
whereas the CAFC decided that it was properly raised in a challenge of the 
final revocation order. Thus,jurisdiction to rule on the margin became attached 
as an incidental bonus to jurisdiction over whichever of the two competing 
151 Several additional criteria must be satisfied in order to obtain a revocation, in addition to zero 
or de minimis margins during the appropriate review period, including a finding that there is no 
likelihood of resumed less-than-FMV sales. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.54. 
152 Should the courts continue to accept elaborate arguments by parties about when they are actually 
"aggrieved" by apparently adverse decisions (as the CAFC did in Freeport), it will be difficult to say 
that any action is out of time. For example, some domestic party may soon argue that it was not 
immediately aggrieved by a revocation because there were no (or a low volume of) imports of the 
subject merchandise that year, and that it should therefore be allowed to challenge the revocation in 
the CIT several years later, on the basis of a subsequent increase in imports. 
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issues raised by the parties (postponement of revocation in Chevron or notice of 
revocation in Freeport) was adopted as dominant by the CAFC.153 In fact, since 
no party raised this issue in a timely manner, it should have been considered 
closed. 
More fundamentally, Freeport left Commerce in doubt about the status of 
cases remanded to it by the CIT, and the ability of nonparties to CIT actions 
to challenge remand results. In the CAFC, Commerce and Chevron had asserted 
that the CIT had maintained jurisdiction over the question of revocation during 
the remand to Commerce. 154 Hence, they argued, revocation was simply the 
CIT -ordered outcome of Chevron's CIT suit-which was res judicata and there-
fore could not be challenged anew in the CIT.155 When the CAFC rejected this 
argument, it seemed to Commerce to be saying that the CIT lost jurisdiction 
over issues remanded to Commerce, and that the result of the remand (revo-
cation) was a new administrative decision which any party to the original ad-
ministrative proceeding could challenge in the CIT.156 It would follow that a 
party to an administrative proceeding could challenge Commerce's determina-
tion and obtain a different determination on remand (acceptable to the CIT), 
which could itself be challenged in the CIT by either the original plaintiff or 
any other party to the administrative proceeding. Implicitly, the whole process 
could be repeated indefinitely.157 
2. Subsequent Interpretation 
The courts have not interpreted Freeport as broadly in subsequent cases as 
Commerce feared they might. Both the CAFC and the CIT have ruled that the 
CIT retains jurisdiction on remand over issues remanded to Commerce, and 
the CIT has made it clear that issues redetermined by Commerce on remand 
153 Once a court had decided to rule separately on the validity of the determination in the admin-
istrative review and the validity of the determination to revoke, it could also have decided which of 
these determinations Freeport was permitted to challenge according to the timeliness of the challenge. 
154 The CIT's December 21, 1983 decision in Roquette Freres v. United States, 6 Ct. Int'l Trade 329 
(1983), provides authority for this proposition. In Roquette, the CIT ruled that the jurisdiction acquired 
by the filing of the summons and the complaint "is continuing until that action is finally decided." Id. 
at 330. The court held that its jurisdiction "once vested ... is neither so fleeting nor illusory as to 
dissipate upon the court's exercise of its inherent discretionary power to require further deliberation 
by the adniinistrative body." Id. at 331. 
155 The CIT decision could only be appealed, and not by Freeport, since it was not a party to the 
CIT action in which the decision was handed down. 
156 The court advised that Congress had not granted the CIT "authority to assume control of an 
agency case, once that case has come to it for judicial review, and retain control over it regardless of 
the statutes which the agency must follow." 758 F.2d at 636. 
157 Some additional implications of the theory that the CIT loses jurisdiction over issues remanded 
to Commerce would be (l) that the CIT lacks authority to enforce its decisions, and (2) to ensure that 
Commerce performs remands within the deadlines it establishes, except through the filing of a new 
complaint based on the court's remand. 
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in accordance with that court's decisions may not be raised anew in the CIT. 
On the other hand, there is still some doubt about issues which arise in an 
administrative proceeding that is already the subject of litigation in the CIT, 
where those issues have not been raised in that litigation. The principal relevant 
decisions are discussed below. 
C. The CAFC's Decision in Cabot 
The Cabot decision 158 arose out of a countervailing duty order against carbon 
black from Mexico, on which Commerce determined that the Mexican govern-
ment was conferring a net bounty or grant of 0.88 percent. I59 The Cabot 
Corporation, a domestic producer of carbon black, challenged Commerce's final 
affirmative determination in the CIT. The basis of its challenge, inter alia, was 
that Commerce had erred in finding that the Mexican government's provision 
of feedstock and natural gas to Mexican producers did not constitute a subsidy 
because they were "generally available" in Mexico at the prices the government 
had charged. The CIT held in Cabot's favor, and remanded the case to Com-
merce for a new determination consistent with its holding on the "generally 
available" standard. I60 
Not wanting to perform a remand under a standard which it subsequently 
would be seeking to overturn, the government appealed. I61 In support of its 
argument to the CAFC that the decision was a final and appealable order, the 
government cited Freeport for the proposition that the CIT had lost jurisdiction 
over the issue of countervailability on remand. Cabot responded that the CIT's 
decision remanding the case to Commerce was not a final order, because it 
plainly called for further action by Commerce prior to final action by the CIT. 
The CAFC ruled that the CIT's remand decision was not final and that the 
government could not appeal at that time. I62 The court dismissed the govern-
ment's Freeport argument summarily, explaining only that "Freeport did not deal 
with the appealability to [the CAFC] of a [CIT] order remanding to the ITA."I63 
15. Cabot Corp. v. United States, 788 F.2d 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
159 48 Fed. Reg. 29,564 (1983). 
160 The CIT ordered Commerce to determine whether the benefit in question, notwithstanding its 
general availability in Mexico, conferred a "competitive advantage" on the Mexican producers. 620 F. 
Supp. 722 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986). 
161 28 U.S.C. § 1295 provides in pertinent part: 
(a) The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction 
(5) of an appeal from a final decision of the United States Court of International Trade. 
The government did not, as the CAFC pointed out, request that the CIT certify the issue for 
interlocutory appeal under 29 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(I), because it believed that the order was final, not 
interlocutory. 788 F.2d at 1543. 
162 788 F.2d at 1539. 
163 [d. at 1543. 
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Since the CAFC did not explain whether the result would have been different 
if, for example, the foreign respondent had challenged the remand determi-
nation in the CIT and appealed a dismissal to the CAFC, it may be that the 
CAFC simply wished to limit Freeport to its facts, or nearly SO.I64 
Although Cabot stops well short of explaining the uncertainties of Freeport, 
the CAFC did state unequivocally its view that the CIT does not lose jurisdiction 
over issues remanded to Commerce for redetermination, and that a remand 
order is not final and appealable "even though [it] resolves an important legal 
issue such as the applicable standard for countervailability."165 
D. The CAFC's Decision in Badger-Powhatan 
A decision handed down by the CIT shortly after Cabot confirmed that court's 
agreement with the latter position. Badger-Powhatan v. United States arose from 
an antidumping duty investigation of brass fire-protection equipment fittings 
from Italy. The investigation covered seven categories of fittings, all of which 
Commerce determined were being sold at less than fair value. The lTC, how-
ever, determined that only two of the seven categories were injuring U.S. 
industry. Commerce's final antidumping duty order covered only those two 
categories for which both dumping and injury had been found. 166 Domestic 
petitioner Badger-Powhatan challenged the final order in the CIT, arguing that 
it should have covered all seven categories of fittings. The CIT rejected Badger-
Powhatan's argument and upheld the order.167 
Following its unsuccessful challenge to the scope of Commerce's order, 
Badger-Powhatan asked the CIT to remand the case to Commerce so that the 
deposit rate, which is the same as the weighted-average dumping margin, could 
be recalculated solely on the basis of the two categories of fittings covered by 
the order. The deposit rate in the original order had been calculated on the 
basis of all seven categories. Commerce conceded the issue, and joined Badger-
Powhatan in requesting a remand for this purpose over the opposition of the 
Italian manufacturer. The CIT then remanded the case to Commerce with 
instructions to recalculate the deposit rate on the basis of the two categories of 
fittings. 16B Commerce performed the remand as ordered and published a final 
antidumping duty order reflecting the new deposit rate in the Federal Register. 169 
164 These facts, as the CAFC pointed out, were "unusual," in that Commerce had published a notice 
stating that Freeport was entitled to revocation, but postponing it on grounds unrelated to that admin-
istrative proceeding. 758 F.2d at 629. If Freeport is limited to these facts, it is narrow indeed. 
165Id. The CAFC repeated this position in its order in Philipp Brothers, Inc. v. United States, Appeal 
No. 86-1122. 
166 50 Fed. Reg. 8,354 (1985). 
167 Badger-Powhatan v. United States, 608 F. Supp. 653 (Ct. Int'I Trade 1985) [hereinafter Badger-
Powlwtan I]. 
168 Badger-Powhatan v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1364 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986) [hereinafter Badger-
Powlwtan II]. 
169 51 Fed. Reg. 17,783 (1986). 
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When the Italian manufacturer appealed the CIT's order of remand, the 
Federal Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction}70 The Federal Circuit con-
cluded, citing Cabot, 17l that the remand order was not final,172 explaining that 
"the parties will still need to appear before the [CIT] if any of them challenges 
the amended determination .... " 173 
Badger-Powhatan adds substantial confusion to the problem of when remand 
results become final and appealable. This is because there are two types of 
remand orders: the CIT may remand a case to Commerce with instructions to 
make a new determination in accordance with the order and then report back 
to the court (as it did in Cabot); or it may instruct Commerce to publish the new 
results directly in the Federal Register (as it did in Badger-Powhatan). Where the 
CIT orders Commerce to report back, a new order, either affirming or over-
turning the results, will be produced, providing an occasion for appeaI.t74 Where 
remand results are published in the Federal Register directly, however, there is 
no apparent avenue back to the CIT. Since it is not clear when the CIT order 
becomes final,175 the deadline by which an appeal must be brought is also 
unclear. A new action in the CIT on the same issue would be barred as res 
Judicata. 
E. The CIT's decision in Al Tech 
Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. United Statesl76 was a challenge by a domestic 
party to an early determination of antidumping duties l77 on tool steel from the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 178 Al Tech complained that Commerce had failed 
to adjust the cost of production of one German respondent, ARBED Saarstahl, 
170 Order of December 29, 1986 (Appeal No. 86-1251). 
171 "This result comports with the policies underlying the finality rule and in particular avoids 
unnecessary piecemeal appellate review of the legal issue or any other determination made on a 
complete administrative record." Cabot, 788 F.2d at 1543. 
172 28 U.S.c. § 1295(a)(5) gives the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit jurisdiction over appeals 
from "final decision[s]" of the CIT. 
173 Order of December 29, 1986 (Appeal No. 86-1251) at p. 5. The Court followed this statement 
with a citation to 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2), implying that Commerce's determination on remand in 
Badger-Powhatan II would have given rise to an entirely new cause of action in the CIT, involving 
identical parties and raising the identical issues just litigated in that court. Since such a new action 
would be barred by res judicata, it seems more plausible to read the Federal Circuit's order as requiring 
simply that the CIT indicate that the issues raised before it may have been finally resolved, so that the 
parties may appeal (there being nothing left to litigate in the CIT). What this mechanism might be is 
not apparent. 
174 The Federal Circuit may have thought that this was the case in Badger-Powhatan I, since it 
described the situation there as "strikingly similar" to Cabot. In fact, the situation in Cabot was different 
in that the CIT had ordered Commerce to report back. 
175 See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (1984). 
176 Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1376 (Ct. Int'I Trade 1986). 
177 Pursuant to section 736(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(c). 
178 49 Fed. Reg. 29,995 (1984). 
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to account for a domestic subsidy it had received. Like Freeport in Chevron, 
Saarstahl did not intervene in Al Tech's action in the CIT. 
Upon considering Al Tech's complaint, Commerce concluded that it had 
overlooked the issue during the review and consented to a remand of the case. 
On remand, Commerce decided that the subsidy should not be added to Saar-
stahl's cost of production in that case. In addition, however, Commerce discov-
ered and corrected a number of errors in the calculation of Saarstahl's margin, 
which increased it from 8.09 percent to 19.35 percent. When Saarstahllearned 
of this increase, it moved to intervene in Al Tech's CIT suit. Commerce opposed 
the intervention. 
Before the CIT, Commerce argued that under Freeport the CIT had lost 
jurisdiction on remand and that Commerce's action was therefore a separate 
determination. There was thus no ongoing CIT action in which Saarstahl could 
intervene, and Saarstahl had to bring a new suit to challenge the remand results. 
The CIT agreed that Saarstahl could not intervene, but not because the court 
had lost jurisdiction over the remand. Instead, the CIT found that it never had 
jurisdiction over the recalculation insofar as it related to the alleged error 
because the issue of those errors had never been brought before it.179 
The CIT concluded that the new margins resulting from correction of the 
alleged errors gave rise to an entirely new cause of action. The court also ruled 
that Commerce's determination not to factor the domestic subsidy into the 
dumping margin was the remand result, over which it had not lost jurisdic-
tion. lso Accordingly, it ruled that Saarstahl could not intervene with respect to 
that issue, since it had not been a party to Al Tech's action. The court distin-
guished Freeport on the basis that Commerce's decision on remand in Ai Tech 
(not to adjust for the subsidy) was the same as its original determination, 
whereas, in Freeport,lSI the result (to revoke) was different. ls2 
F. Conclusion 
From the foregoing, it seems clear that the CIT does not lose jurisdiction 
over issues it remands to Commerce for redetermination, and that orders of 
remand may not be appealed. ls3 It also appears, at least from the CIT cases, 
179 The court stated that the dumping margin was "a wholly independent act of ITA," having 
"nothing to do with the case at hand." 633 F. Supp. at 1381. 
180Id. at 1379. 
181 Chevron Ltd. v. United States, 563 F. Supp. 1381 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983). 
182 633 F. Supp. at 1379. This basis for distinguishing Freeport here seems to follow the CAFC's 
rationale in Freeport that a party to an administrative proceeding need not raise an issue until it is 
harmed by a determination on that issue. It would follow that, had Commerce taken the subsidy into 
account and increased the margin, Al Tech would have been free to intervene, even though it had 
not intervened in the original action raising that precise issue. 
18' Except as certified for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(I). 
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that remand results, insofar as they merely implement the resolution of issues 
already litigated before the CIT, may not be challenged anew in that court. 
Additionally, remand results which finally resolve issues for the first time (or 
which resolve them contrary to Commerce's initial resolution) create new causes 
of action in the CIT. 
This system seems logical, but it may prove very difficult to implement. First, 
as described above, there is substantial confusion regarding when remand re-
sults become final and appealable. Second, the issues in antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty cases are often too complex to be neatly circumscribed and tend 
to shift on remand. As a result, even if the CIT identifies the issues to be 
resolved on remand quite clearly, it may not always be possible to discern 
whether the issues raised by a challenge to the remand results are old or new. 
If the courts do not succeed in segregating old issues from new ones, one 
result will be to nullify the statutory deadlines for challenging Commerce de-
terminations in the CIT.184 This potential is best illustrated by considering the 
result in NEC v. United States, in which the plaintiffs sought to challenge Com-
merce's second review of televisions from Japan. 18S The CIT dismissed NEC's 
suit as untimely,186 and the Federal Circuit affirmed. 187 The result of the second 
review of televisions from Japan was also challenged by the domestic petitioner, 
however, and was subsequently remanded by the CIT to Commerce. 188 In 
performing the remand, Commerce reached the same basic result, but, because 
of a slight difference in the way in which the adjustment concerned was made, 
NEC's margin decreased from 0.86 percent to 0.77 percent. 18g 
Under the cases discussed above, it should be clear that the lower margin, 
once published as final, will not give NEC a new cause of action in the CIT. 
Even if NEC's margin ultimately should increase substantially because of the 
issues raised by Zenith in the CIT, NEC should be barred from challenging 
that action in the CIT because it failed to intervene in Zenith's suit. Only to the 
extent that NEC's margin in the second review increases because of new factors 
that were neither present in Commerce's original determination nor raised by 
Zenith should NEC be able to challenge the remand results, and then only the 
increase in its final margin over the margin in Commerce's original determi-
184 See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1984). 
185 50 Fed. Reg. 24.278 (1985). 
186 622 F. Supp. 1086 (Ct. Int'I Trade 1985); reh'g denied, 628 F. Supp. 976 (Ct. Int'I Trade 1986). 
The action was untimely because of plaintiff's failure to affix adequate postage on the envelope 
containing the summons. 
187 Slip op. of November 28, 1986. 
188 Zenith v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1382 (Ct. Int'I Trade 1986). The remand opinion directed 
Commerce to recalculate its adjustment for a commodity tax imposed on televisions sold in Japan, but 
not on televisions exported to the United States. 
189 Determination on remand of April 14. 1986. 
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nation specifically attributable to those new factors. Any other result would be 
contrary to the Federal Circuit's decision in NEG. 
VI. OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 
The issues discussed in this article can be consolidated under the theme of 
what the courts, the Department, and private litigants think the effect of CIT 
decisions should be on the antidumping and countervailing duty determinations 
of the Department. Of course it is the Department's statutorily mandated obli-
gation to investigate, review, and make final determinations on whether parties 
are subsidizing or selling their exports at less than fair value to the United 
States and, if so, at what rate. 190 It is the function, also statutorily mandated, of 
the courts to review the record made by the agency during the administrative 
proceedings and decide whether a challenged determination is supported by 
substantial evidence or is otherwise in accordance with law. 191 The court can 
then either affirm the agency's action or reverse it in whole or in part and 
remand to the agency for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. 
All of this appears to be a fairly straightforward scheme. In practice, however, 
a great many disputes arise which indicate that private litigants, the Department, 
and the courts often have very different ideas about the following issues: How 
broad are the courts' discretionary powers with regard to exhaustion and stand-
ing? At what point does an agency determination cease, and a court decision 
commence, to govern agency action? When should an agency have to perform 
a remand before it can appeal? What is the effect of an agency redetermination 
on remand, whether the agency intends to appeal or not? What are the rights 
of other parties and nonparties with respect to a redetermination? 
Even after outlining the issues and the disputes arising from these situations, 
however, many private litigants may ask "So what?" Why discuss these issues as 
part of one broad principle which requires consistency and uniformity in its 
application? Why not let the courts decide these issues on a case-by-case basis, 
doing whatever seems equitable based on the facts of each case? 
It is logical that this case-by-case approach would be acceptable to private 
litigants. They realize that these issues are neutral in that they do not favor one 
type of party (i.e., domestic interests, foreign exporters, importers) over another. 
Attorneys who represent private parties in these cases would rather see these 
issues remain unsettled and decided case by case because they want the flexibility 
to argue for the application of the law based on the unique facts of their 
particular case and be able to win in various circumstances depending on which 
side of the issue they find themselves. For example, if the courts do not have a 
190 See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1986). 
191 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1984) 
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very clear standard of when they will require a party to exhaust its administrative 
remedies, then, depending on whether the party is the one that failed to exhaust 
its administrative remedies or the one who will be harmed if the court allows 
new issues to be raised, the party will argue that its situation either warrants an 
exception to the requirement of exhaustion or that the facts of the case require 
exhaustion. Clearly, from the private litigant's point of view, uncertainty in this 
area has its advantages. 
It is also clear that judges do not want to make broad rulings on these 
procedural matters since they want flexibility to decide these matters based on 
the facts and the equities of each situation. Of course, the courts' rulings should 
not be broader than the dispute presented to them. However, by ruling on the 
procedural questions in a very fact-specific manner, the court is withholding 
guidance from the Department and private parties, and is encouraging repeti-
tious litigation on these points. Court cases which, while only ruling on the 
single factual dispute raised in the case before them, explain the broader legal 
principles on which they rely, provide guidance to agencies and private parties 
which will allow them to conform their actions to the court's views. 
The Department's concerns about the law on these procedural issues involving 
relationships between the courts and the Department are different from those 
of the courts or of private litigants. These concerns result from the fact that 
the Department is almost always the defendant in litigation and from the fact 
that the Department is continually conducting administrative proceedings in a 
large number of cases which can be affected by the courts' rulings on these 
issues. Because they deal with particular cases, the courts rule without address-
ing how the decision could be applied in the hundreds of other similar situations 
before the Department. Private parties, even when they lose an issue in litigation, 
are often only affected in that one case since they may never be in the same 
situation again. 
The Department, on the other hand, will be in the same situation many times 
in the future. The agency must make decisions every day based on how it 
believes the courts will rule if the decision is challenged. If the courts state the 
general principles of law on which they base their decisions, the Department 
can predict how a court is likely to rule in other similar cases and act accordingly. 
If the courts are not clear about the principles which they are applying, and 
instead decide issues on very narrow factual grounds, the Department cannot 
set up the rules for its proceedings with any certainty and cannot elicit the 
cooperation of private parties, since they may feel free to ignore the agency 
and take a chance on setting up a sympathetic fact pattern for the courts. 
Aside from the Department's very real need for a degree of predictability 
from court decisions so that it can take actions that will be upheld, the Depart-
ment is also greatly concerned about the recent tendency of parties to file 
contempt of court actions against agency officials and motions for sanctions 
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because the agency has failed to take some action. Many of these contempt and 
sanction actions arise in the types of cases that this article has discussed. In an 
area where decisions are few and often contradictory, or so limited by the facts 
of the case that they cannot be generalized to other situations, the Department 
has the burden of attempting to act in accordance with law in the area where 
the law is very unclear. Because the law is not settled and because these issues 
involve the very sensitive area of relationships between the courts and the 
agencies, bad faith allegations and motions for contempt are most often brought 
up in the context of these matters. While courts and private parties may see no 
common thread or necessity for discussion and clarification, from the Depart-
ment's point of view, these issues are the ones that cause the most disruption 
of its administrative proceedings and are most wasteful of its resources, both in 
fighting repetitious litigation and in redoing administrative determinations. 
Although the Department has not been found in contempt, been sanctioned, 
or been found guilty of bad faith, the mere threat that a private litigant will 
allege that the Department is ignoring the authority of the court could have a 
chilling effect on the Department's ability to make good faith arguments when 
issues involving the relationship between the courts and the agency are involved. 
Good law in these areas will only come about through adversarial proceedings 
in which both sides are free to make their views known to the court. 
The issues discussed in this article are all part of the broad subject of the 
relationship of the courts to the agency, the role of the courts in agency pro-
ceedings, or the effect of court decisions on agency actions. Each instance reflects 
the basic~ issue of the balance of powers between the courts and the Commerce 
Department. Each of the issues discussed illustrates the problems of knowing 
clearly what the law is, as well as the difficulties the Department has in attempt-
ing to act in accordance with law. In order to focus these issues for discussion 
and perhaps future legislative and agency action, we summarize below where 
the law appears to be with regard to each issue and suggest whether changes 
in legislation or by the agency are needed or whether further court decisions 
on the issues may resolve any remaining uncertainties. 
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
The first issue discussed in this article is the doctrine of exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies. This issue strikes at the very heart of the separation of 
powers between the court and the Commerce Department. If a party is allowed 
to raise an issue for the first time in the court proceeding, then there is no 
administrative record on which to base judicial review. Commerce will always 
argue for a very strict reading of the requirement of exhaustion. Not to require 
exhaustion is in most cases to allow the court to take over the function of the 
Department. Since these cases are subject to review on the record, not requiring 
1987] ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS 231 
a party to exhaust will result in a remand to the Department to allow the party 
to raise the issue, allow other parties to comment, and allow the Department to 
make a determination on the issue. In other words, the Department will have 
to reprocess the administrative proceeding for the new issue. The Department 
is required to expend time and limited resources to do something which could 
have been done in a timely manner during the original administrative proceed-
ing. This disrupts the Department's processing of administrative cases. The 
situation is even worse if the court decides to entertain the issue but does not 
remand the issue to the agency; then the court is not applying the proper 
standard of review and is conducting a de novo review of that issue. 
As we stated earlier, the CIT has acknowledged the exhaustion doctrine and 
agrees that it applies to cases under these laws. In some cases, however, the 
court has used its discretion in applying the doctrine to allow exceptions which, 
from an agency view, appear to write the doctrine out of existence. In one 
case I92 the court has required a party to exhaust; in others the court has found 
a carefully circumscribed exception to exhaustion; and in other cases the court 
appears to have developed excuses rather than refuse to allow a party to raise 
an issue for the first time in the court. I9' It is clear that the standard of review 
in these trade cases clearly supports the requirement of exhaustion in most 
situations, that the courts have acknowledged that exhaustion applies to these 
cases, and that the court opinions are varied but still too few in number to 
suggest any definite trend on this issue. Because of these factors, there is 
probably no need for a legislative change at this time. 
There is very little that the Department can do to affect this doctrine. It is 
impossible for the Department to make a determination and explain its reasons 
on the record for each of the hundreds of hidden decisions that may be made 
in every antidumping and countervailing duty proceeding just in case the court 
allows a party to raise a question about one of these decisions for the first time 
in court. 
B. Standing 
The second issue in the court-agency relationship concerns the standing of 
parties to maintain a lawsuit on antidumping and countervailing duty cases. 
This issue is very similar to exhaustion in its impact on the Department's 
proceedings. The effect of allowing someone who was not a party to the pro-
ceeding and, thus, does not have standing, to maintain a lawsuit against the 
192 Kokusai Electric Co. Ltd. v. United States, 632 F. Supp. 23 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986). 
19' See, e.g., Washington Red Rasberry Comm'n v. United States, No. 87-29, slip op. (March 17, 
1987); Philipp Brothers v. United States, 630 F. Supp. 1317 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986); Timken Co. v. 
United States, 630 F. Supp. 1327 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986). 
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Department harms the authority of the Department's proceedings and the rights 
of other parties who did participate in the administrative proceedings. On this 
issue it would seem that the government and most private litigants would at 
least generally agree. It is not in the interest of any of the parties who partici-
pated in the administrative process to have a nonparty file an action in court to 
overturn what they spent a great deal of money and time to achieve at the 
administrative level. Of course, there will be disagreements over exactly what 
the standing requirement is in its precise application to specific facts. 
The courts have been consistent in their holding that a party cannot sue 
unless it was a party to the proceeding below. Although the CIT has sometimes 
drawn the line at a slightly different point from where the Department would 
have drawn it, these differences have not been of the type that allowed totally 
new parties who never appeared in the administrative proceeding to appear for 
the first time in a court challenge. In one case, while completely agreeing with 
the Department's position that a party who had not been a party to the pro-
ceeding did not have standing, the court nonetheless allowed full briefing on 
the merits of the case and reserved judgment on jurisdiction until it could be 
determined whether the Department had acted "patently" beyond its authority 
so that the party could maintain its action under 28 U .S.C. 1581 (i).194 A decision 
such as this, while acknowledging the standing requirement, almost completely 
writes it out of the law by allowing an exception which, based on its facts, almost 
anyone would be able to meet. The exception for actions "patently" beyond the 
authority of the agency should be limited to extreme situations and not used in 
a case where the issue is so unclear that a full briefing on the merits is needed 
before it can be determined whether the agency was acting "patently" beyond 
its authority. 
Decisions such as this weaken the authority of the Department to conduct 
administrative proceedings and to require interested parties to comply with its 
rules. Decisions which allow parties to evade the technical requirements of 
maintaining an action against the Department tell parties that the administrative 
rules are not really important. It tells parties that they can ignore the Depart-
ment and bring their complaint to the court because it is more important that 
anyone with a complaint be heard than that the agency be able to enforce its 
procedures in its hundreds of cases. The statute is clear that there is a standing 
requirement and the Department is attempting to clarify further what is meant 
by "party to the proceeding" in its new regulations. 195 It does not appear, 
therefore, that legislative or further Departmental changes are needed on this 
194 Miller and Co. v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 1126, 1130-31 (Ct. Int"I Trade 1984). 
195 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1984) provides that a sui, may be brought by an "interested party to the 
proceeding." 
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issue. We are hopeful that further court decisions will be adequate to settle the 
Issue. 
C. Challenges to Remand Results 
Our third issue, concerning what point in time a CIT decision commences, 
and an original agency determination ceases, to govern the administrative ac-
tions of the agency, is central to our overall theme of the balance of powers 
between the courts and the agency. This issue must be viewed in the context of 
the unique nature of antidumping and countervailing duty cases, the continuing 
entries of merchandise covered by these cases, and the realities of the customs 
liquidation procedures. The statute clearly takes account of these factors by 
providing that liquidation of entries shall be governed by the contested agency 
determination until there is a final court decision inconsistent with that agency 
determination. 196 This issue should not be viewed as a case of an agency showing 
disrespect for court decisions. It is only a question of the timing and effectiveness 
of agency and court decisions. 
It is understandable that the CIT would hesitate to rule that the effect of its 
decisions should be delayed. The CAFC's Melamine decision, however, has held 
that this should be the result when the lower court decision in these antidumping 
and countervailing duty cases is appealed. In addition, because of the continuing 
nature of administrative proceedings and the fact that entries of merchandise 
are continually being made while court cases are proceeding, it is necessary that 
there be an orderly and identifiable time when court decisions inconsistent with 
the original agency opinion will commence to govern agency action. This iden-
tifiable time should also not result in the back and forth pattern-liquidation/ 
suspension of liquidation, administrative review/nonadministrative review-
which causes unnecessary disruption of trade and which encourages parties to 
file cases even if only in the hope of getting the status quo changed for a short 
time. At the time this article is being written, there are no court rulings other 
than the Melamine decision on this issue. It could be that this issue will not be 
clearly decided even in the cases pending before the CIT. Since the CAFC in 
American Lamb Co. v. United States l97 has overruled a CIT decision that had 
overturned the International Trade Commission's preliminary injury standard, 
and because this is the underlying issue in the other cases l9S where the effect 
of a CIT decision is at issue, it is possible that those cases will be disposed of 
on other grounds and the CIT will not rule on the issue in the near future. At 
this time, therefore, the only judicial interpretation on this issue is that found 
196 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1984). 
197 785 F.2d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
198 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
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in Melamine. The government argues that this case supports its position that 
when the statute says that a final court decision inconsistent with the agency 
determination will govern agency action, final means after the appeal process 
is over. 
The position of private litigants on this issue, of course, varies according to 
whether they are supporting the agency's original interpretation or are opposing 
it. The party who wins at the CIT would of course like to have that victory 
translate into immediate agency action while the agency and the party sup-
porting the agency would like the chance to appeal first. As we have pointed 
out with regard to the Department's position on other issues involving the 
relationship between the courts and the Department, our position-that the 
agency determination governs until after a final, nonappealable court decision 
inconsistent with it-is neutral in its application to different types of parties. 
This is not a "protectionist" or a "free trade" position. If, after filing an anti-
dumping petition, a U.S. industry gets an affirmative ruling from both the ITA 
and the lTC, and an order is issued, all liquidation of entries of the subject 
merchandise will be suspended until it is determined whether antidumping 
duties are due. Under the theory that the CIT decision is final, if the foreign 
manufacturers challenge the ITA or ITC in the CIT and win a decision that 
either the ITA or ITC determination should have been negative, then the order 
would have to be revoked; all entries would be liquidated and could never be 
subjected to antidumping duties even if the CIT decision is then overturned by 
the CAFC. The same harm would result to the foreign manufacturers and 
importers if they first get a negative ITA or ITC determination, which is then 
overturned by the CIT. The fact that the finality issue is neutral in its impact 
on domestic and foreign parties suggests that arguments should be based on 
strict legal principles and the intent of the statute, and not on charges that the 
Department is making arguments for "policy" reasons. From the Department's 
view, there can be no doubt that issues of convenience and efficiency playa role 
in its position. It certainly is more efficient for the agency to expend its limited 
resources on administering the investigations and reviews with which it is 
charged rather than on conducting investigations which may never result in 
any final action because the underlying court decision is reversed on appeal. 
Administrative convenience, however, is by no means the primary motivation. 
In fact, from the standpoint of saving resources, it would be better for the 
Department to revoke orders when the CIT rules that a determination should 
have been negative because even if this decision is reversed on appeal the 
Department will have avoided forever the work it would have had to do to 
review those entries. From the Department's view, however, its position on this 
issue is the most consistent with the intent of the statute, is neutral in its impact 
on parties, and is the most reasonable and efficient interpretation. This is an 
issue which the court needs to address further before legislative or Departmental 
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changes are proposed. Nonetheless, in these times of stable or declining agency 
resources, the Department has the responsibility to be prepared to propose to 
Congress that the wiser use of Commerce resources will follow from the finality 
decision of Melamine. 
Another issue which is closely related to the question of when a CIT decision 
becomes controlling is the question of when the agency can appeal a CIT 
opinion before completing the remand ordered by the court. To set this question 
in perspective, it is necessary to understand that the recent CIT and CAFC 
opinions on this topic responded to the Department's view that the CAFC 
opinion in Freeport meant that the CIT lost jurisdiction of a case after it ruled 
and remanded the case to the agency to act. Under that theory, it was necessary 
for the Department to appeal any CIT decision before it acted on the remand 
or risk losing its right to appeal. It now appears from recent decisions that 
neither the CIT nor the CAFC interprets the law in this manner. Therefore, 
the present state of judicial decisions seems to suggest that in most cases when 
the CIT rules and orders a remand to the Department, the decision cannot be 
appealed until the remand is reported back to the CIT and affirmed. There 
are undoubtedly some cases where the CIT's decision would be final and ap-
pealable immediately, even though a remand to the agency is ordered. For 
purposes of this discussion, however, we will examine the situations where the 
court orders a remand and permission to appeal immediately is denied because 
the decision is found not to be final. In this situation the question becomes 
whether the CIT should grant the Department a stay of a remand and allow 
interlocutory appeal. This question is very unsettled at the present time. 
Clearly, the CIT has granted interlocutory appeal and a stay in cases involving 
the Department. At present, however, it is not clear how the CIT is likely to 
rule on questions of stays of remands while an appeal is taken. In cases where 
a remand is merely for the purpose of clarifying an agency position, correcting 
a procedural error, or making a finding of fact not based on a new legal theory, 
it will often be the case that the agency should complete the remand before it 
appeals so that the CAFC has a complete record on which to base its decision. 
However, when the court's remand orders the Department to apply a whole 
new theory of law or to develop a new methodology based on an interpretation 
of the statute with which the agency disagrees, the Department believes it is in 
everyone's best interest to allow the appeal before the agency is required to 
comply with the remand. 
The Department's position is based on the nature of its ongoing investigative 
and review functions and the impact of a court decision involving an important 
legal question on decision making in many other agency cases. When the court 
makes a decision on a legal issue, such as that the Department's regulation on 
an exporter's sales price offset cap is invalid, this decision will have an impact 
in the many other proceedings before the Department. For the Department to 
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perform the remand and report back to the court would have wasted time. 
Such was the case in Silver Reed, in which the court's decision was clear and 
results of the remand would not have narrowed the issues any more for the 
appellate court. 199 In the meantime, the CIT's ruling that one of the Depart-
ment's regulations was invalid was causing every foreign respondent and im-
porter to argue that the Department could not apply the regulation in its 
investigation or review. Not wanting to concede the issue, the Department 
continued to apply the regulation in all administrative cases and the parties filed 
lawsuits to challenge the application of the regulation. As long as the issue 
remained pending in the CIT on remand, and until there was a final CAFC 
opinion, the Department was facing a backlog of court cases and potential 
remands if it eventually lost the issue at the appellate level. By allowing the 
immediate appeal of the issue the CIT allowed the Department to get a ruling 
on a legal issue and thereby stop the flood of lawsuits and the uncertainty that 
existed with regard to this question. Even if the Department had lost at the 
appellate level, the interlocutory appeal would still have saved resources for the 
government and for private parties because the Department would have dis-
continued the use of the rule in its administrative cases at an earlier date, 
thereby saving lawsuits and remands. It is the Department's position that when 
a remand involves a legal issue which will arise in other cases, it is almost always 
more efficient and equitable for all parties to certify the question for appeal 
and stay the remand. The uncertainty in all ongoing administrative cases and 
the proliferation of lawsuits makes a speedy appellate decision in these anti-
dumping and countervailing duty cases a necessity. 
As with several of the other issues in this paper, it appears we need more 
judicial decisions on this issue before we can say with certainty that legislative 
or administrative changes are needed. When it has decided to appeal, the 
Department will continue to apply the law as it interprets it in all administrative 
determinations until the CAFC rules on the issues. To do otherwise would be 
for the Department to concede the issue in other cases and not be able to appeal 
it. The Department would not be able to change these determinations if it 
eventually won the issue in the CAFC in the first case. 
Any harm to particular private parties can be minimized. In an administrative 
determination in which the Department continues to apply its interpretation of 
the law, a party who believes the Department should have applied the law as 
the CIT interpreted it in a particular court case will be able to file suit against 
the Department's determination. The party will be able to move for an injunc-
tion to prevent the liquidation of entries based on what it believes is the incorrect 
199 Silver Reed America, Inc. v. United States, 581 F. Supp 1290 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), rev'd Consumer 
Products Division, SCM Corp. v. Silver Reed America, Inc., 753 F.2d 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
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Department interpretation and, if successful, the entries will be liquidated in 
accordance with the court's interpretation. If the Department does not take the 
position that it must apply the law as it interprets it until overturned by an 
appellate court decision, then the government could be forced to make "wrong" 
determinations in several proceedings which it will never be able to correct even 
if it eventually wins the issue on appeal. 
The final issue in this article is what a remand to the Department means and 
what are the rights and obligations of all parties in relation to a determination 
that the Department makes and publishes pursuant to a remand order from 
the court. The issues in this area are probably the least clear of any discussed 
in this article. The questions about remands came about as a result of the 
Freeport decision by the CAFC. That ruling made it appear that the CAFC had 
very different ideas about the role of the CIT after it remands a case to the 
Department and about the nature of a published remand determination. As 
discussed in the paper, there have been several court decisions which have 
attempted to explain or distinguish the Freeport decision. Although these opin-
ions have not reconciled Freeport with the judicial review framework of the 
statute, it is perhaps because that decision cannot be justified in any broader 
context than its own unique facts. 
The Department's view of a remand proceeding (since the court has rejected 
the Department's interpretation of Freeport in several discussions) is just about 
back to where it was before Freeport: The court does not lose jurisdiction of the 
case when it remands to the Department; however, the remand proceeding 
itself is an administrative matter and the court should not interfere while that 
is proceeding except for issues concerning timing of the final results to the 
court. When the final remand results are reported back to the court it will then 
make its final ruling on the case. When the court affirms the remand results, 
the Department can appeal the court's final order, including any and all prior 
interlocutory rulings in the case. This is important because in the final order 
the court usually affirms what the Department has done even though the 
Department only reached the result because of the court's prior ruling reversing 
the Department's determination. 
All of this may seem quite obvious to private litigants and they sometimes 
believe that the Department is inventing problems that will never happen. It 
has been the Department's experience, however, that in procedural issues in-
volving the courts' review function, if the Department does not challenge am-
biguous rulings by raising the issue in other cases the issues will not be clarified. 
If these issues are not clear, an apparently limited court decision may be used 
in some future action to deny the Department a right to appeal or to force the 
Department to take an action with which it does not agree. The Department 
does not have the luxury of letting small time bombs tick away in obscure cases. 
Since the Department is always the defendent and presently is involved in nearly 
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two hundred lawsuits, it is almost certain that when one of these time bombs 
goes off the Department will be injured. It therefore becomes the Department's 
burden to test issues in cases so that they will be decided and clarified through 
other court decisions. The Department will then know what the law is and be 
able to act accordingly. It is for this reason that the Department interpreted the 
Freeport decision and then attempted to follow it in other cases. The Department 
forced the court to consider the issue, and even though the Department's view 
has not been adopted, the Department now has a better idea of how the courts 
will rule on the issue so that it can perform its remands accordingly. It is less 
likely to face a creative Freeport argument that would change the rules on the 
Department in the middle of an important case. 
The final issue in this paper also deals with the concept of what a published 
remand determination is and what are the rights of parties to challenge it. The 
Freeport case at first caused the Department concern that a case would never 
end in the courts because parties who did not intervene in a case could file a 
new suit against the remand determination if the court overturned the Depart-
ment. It now appears the courts will not take such a broad view of the rights 
of parties to challenge a published remand determination. Although the De-
partment will await live cases to decide on a position here, it would appear that 
there may be circumstances in which the Department would agree that a party 
could challenge certain aspects of a court ordered remand determination. These 
aspects could not be issues already challenged and therefore at issue in the 
court case or issues which existed and should have been challenged within thirty 
days of the original determination. 
The question of exactly what is the court's authority over a remand proceed-
ing and what are the rights of parties to challenge a remand determination in 
a new court case are far from settled. The CAFC opinion in Badger-Powhatan 
has served only to further complicate this issue. Until there is another CAFC 
opinion on this issue that actually addresses the problem, it is impossible to 
know exactly what the court had in mind in Freeport. The Department will 
attempt to follow what it now believes is the law as interpreted by the CIT and 
the CAFC. Remands will continue to be treated as administrative actions but 
the final remand results will be returned to the court to be affirmed (or re-
manded again) before they are published. The Department will continue to 
argue that there is a very limited right to file a new suit against published 
remand determinations. Legislative changes would not be easy to fashion in this 
area since it is very much a question of jurisdiction and the rights of parties to 
sue. 
By our statement of the basis for the Department's positions on the exhaus-
tion, standing, and finality issues discussed in this article, we have necessarily 
made clear our views on changes we feel the courts and the private international 
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trade bar should make. There are changes the Department should make as 
well. 
With the exhaustion requirement, the Department demands that parties give 
it the chance to address an issue before raising the issue in court. The corollary 
to the exhaustion requirement is that the Department must provide parties with 
clearly stated and consistently applied rules for timely presentation of issues. If 
the issue is presented on a timely basis, Commerce must also be willing to 
explore the issue thoroughly, both to provide parties with a meaningful oppor-
tunity to influence the administrative determination, and to preclude a later 
claim, based on the exhaustion rule, that the Department did not address the 
issue. The agency needs to keep in mind that the exhaustion rule does not exist 
to satisfy some pro forma need to touch base first with the agency, but to give 
the agency the opportunity to correct its own mistakes or avoid committing 
error in the first instance. Such an opportunity avoids needless expenditure of 
resources on litigation by private parties, the courts, and the Department. 
With regard to remands and appeals, we are aware that some have viewed 
the Department's approach to these subjects as self-serving, or worse. We hope 
this article has given the reader a better understanding of the purpose behind 
the Department's positions. On the other hand, the Department must clearly 
recognize that immediate appeal, or any appeal at all, may delay relief to private 
litigants if the CAFC affirms. For this reason, the Department should exercise 
special care in deciding whether immediate appeal and a stay of the remand is 
appropriate. The agency should examine closely whether its desire for imme-
diate appellate review serves well the purposes we have articulated here. 
Further, the Department should ensure that every decision as to whether to 
request appeal at all is made in the exercise of its most considered judgment. 
Not every disagreement in legal interpretation between the CIT and Commerce 
needs to be resolved by the CAFC. Reconsideration by Commerce of its position 
when the issue next arises, or fuller development of the facts in another inves-
tigation,may cause the Department or the CIT to change position. Even if the 
Department or the court does not alter its position, the reasons may be articu-
lated more completely in the context of differing factual situations. Only when 
the issue has been fully explored in this manner, or when it is among the 
fundamental principles of the Department's administration of the law, should 
the appellate court be called in to resolve the dispute. 
We have said that the Department has great respect for the statutory scheme 
of judicial review. It is the responsibility of the Department to continue to 
translate that respect into action in its day-to-day relationship with the court. 
